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PRIVATIZING FEDERAL LOW INCOME
HOUSING ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF
PUBLIC HOUSING
Michael H. Schill t
In recent years, due to budgetary constraints and two conserva-
tive presidential administrations, the White House and Congress
have increasingly debated whether the public sector has grown too
large and unwieldy. Frequently, the context for these debates is the
issue of "privatization." Presidents, legislators, and academics have
advocated that various activities currently performed by the govern-
ment be shifted to non-governmental actors. In 1988, the Presi-
dent's Commission on Privatization recommended that the federal
government privatize a broad array of services presently provided
by the public sector, including education, the administration of pris-
ons and the construction of low income housing.'
As part of its report, the Commission on Privatization recom-
mended that Congress direct the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to sell public housing
units to tenants at discounted prices.2 Legislation providing for the
privatization of public housing has been considered by Congress
since 1984.3 In 1986, the House of Representatives passed a bill
sponsored by then Representative Jack Kemp which would have
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1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EF-
FECTIVE GOVERNMENT (March 1988).
2 See id. at 17-18; see also PeterJ. Ferrara, The Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP III: POLICY STRATEGIES FOR THE 1990s 285, 295-96
(Charles L. Heatherly & Burton Yale Pines eds. 1989) (Heritage Foundation recommen-
dation that public housing authorities be required to sell public housing to resident
management corporations).
3 See, e.g., H.R. 4628, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H1986 (1986) [herein-
after H.R. 4628]; S. 3030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S12,177 (1984) [herein-
after S. 3030]; H.R. 6317, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 10,364 (1984)
[hereinafter H.R. 6317].
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given a tenant of public housing the right to purchase his or her
dwelling at a price not to exceed twenty-five percent of the unit's
fair market value.4 Although the legislation did not pass in the Sen-
ate, Congress enacted statutes in 1988 to facilitate the sale of public
housing units to tenants. As the Commission on Privatization rec-
ommendations indicate, privatization of public housing remains at
the forefront of housing policy debates. In fact, since his appoint-
ment as Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, Secretary Kemp has repeatedly reaffirmed his commitment
to the sale of public housing, "pledg[ing] the full resources" of
HUD to achieving that objective.5
In this Article, I argue that a federal requirement that public
housing be sold to tenants at discounted prices is unfair, unwise and
unconstitutional. In Part I of this Article, I survey and assess the
normative arguments in favor of privatization. Although many pro-
ponents of privatization tend to overstate the failings of govern-
ment, their arguments favoring an increased reliance on the private
sector in the provision of public goods and services are well sup-
ported by theoretical and empirical evidence. In Part II, I investi-
gate the proper role of the federal government in increasing the
housing opportunities of low income households.6 Among the is-
sues addressed are (1) whether public sector intervention in the
4 See H.R. 4628 (adopted by House of Representatives as an amendment to H.R. 1,
132 CONG. REC. H3530-H3542 (daily ed. June 11, 1986)).
5 See Jack Kemp, A Seven Point Agenda to Strengthen Resident Management and
Public Housing Homeownership (Address to National Convention on Resident Manage-
ment and Urban Homesteading), reprinted in 135 CONG. REc. E1077 (daily ed. Apr. 5,
1989). For further expressions of Secretary Kemp's support for the sale of public hous-
ing, see infra notes 152-53. On March 20, 1990, a group of Republican Party senators
introduced the Bush Administration's first set of housing proposals, aptly named the
"Homeownership and Opportunity For People Everywhere Act of 1990 (HOPE)." See S.
2304, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG REc. 2788 (1990) [hereinafter HOPE]. Title I of
HOPE would implement a mandatory public housing sales program. For a summary of
the proposed public housing sales program, see infra note 152.
6 The federal government also indirectly intervenes in the housing market on be-
half of middle and upper income households, primarily through its support of home-
ownership. Federal tax law does not require the taxation of imputed rental income and
permits homeowners to deduct real property taxes and mortgage interest payments. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988) (interest deduction); I.R.C. § 164 (a)(1) (property tax de-
duction); U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 85 (failure to tax
imputed income); Cushing Dolbeare, How The Income Tax System Subsidizes Housing For the
Affluent, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 264 (Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman &
Ann Meyerson eds. 1986) (criticizing tax subsidies for homeownership on equity
grounds). In addition, the federal government facilitates access to real estate credit by
supporting the secondary mortgage market and by providing mortgage insurance. See
generally ANTHONY DowNs, THE REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE 234-62 (1985);
MICHAEL LEA, HOUSING AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS (M.I.T. Housing Policy Project HP
#8, 1988); Michael H. Schill, Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990's: The Implications
of Changing Financial Markets (1990) (unpublished manuscript).
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housing market is justified and (2) how that intervention can be effi-
ciently and effectively structured. I begin by examining the
problems that housing policy is designed to alleviate and conclude
that, over the past fifty years, the nature of the housing problem has
changed from one of insufficient quality to one of affordability.
Although providing low income households with sufficient re-
sources to afford habitable housing might be achieved by pure in-
come transfers rather than subsidies tied to housing, market
imperfections and constraints, as well as political considerations,
support assistance earmarked to housing consumption.
At present, low income housing assistance employs a mixed sys-
tem of public and private ownership. The federal government has
subsidized the construction of over 1.3 million public housing units
owned and operated by the public sector. A larger number of
households are assisted by federal rent subsidies and vouchers that
supplement the amounts paid by tenants for housing owned and op-
erated by non-governmental entities. I examine in Part II whether
the theoretical predictions of privatization proponents are consis-
tent with housing market realities. I find that existing data support
the prediction that housing allowances and vouchers are usually
more efficient and at least as effective as government provision of
public housing. I also present evidence from the history and opera-
tion of the public housing program to explain why government con-
struction programs tend to be less efficient than programs that rely
on the private sector. Although I conclude, based on this analysis,
that future federal programs should rely primarily on subsidizing
the purchasing power of tenants with respect to privately owned
housing, I also describe certain circumstances under which public
housing can efficiently and effectively achieve social objectives.
Although I advocate privatizingfuture delivery of housing assist-
ance in Part II, I do not subscribe to recent proposals that would sell
existing public housing to tenants at sharply discounted prices. To
the contrary, in Part III, I argue that the normative objective of
transforming low income tenants into homeowners is grounded on
a series of tenuous arguments and questionable empirical assump-
tions. Furthermore, data collected by researchers on similar British
privatization programs and my own interviews and visits to British
council housing estates suggest that American proposals to sell pub-
lic housing would be inequitable with respect to tenants of public
housing and households that desire public accommodation. In ad-
dition, granting tenants the right to purchase their dwellings would
likely lead to financial difficulties for public housing authorities and
disinvestment of their remaining housing stock.
Despite the recent debate about privatization among policy-
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1990] PRIVATIZING FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE
makers and social scientists, surprisingly little discussion has ad-
dressed the legal context of efforts to transfer public functions to
private actors. Those who have considered these issues generally
conclude that the Constitution is not a significant barrier to priva-
tization efforts. 7 In Part IV, I examine the constitutionality of recent
public housing sales proposals. I conclude that, in addition to being
unwise, current proposals to require public housing authorities to
sell their housing to tenants at discounted prices would violate the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Depending on
how one characterizes the property interest of the public housing
authority in its stock of housing, requiring a public housing author-
ity to transfer title to its property at a fraction of its value would
constitute a taking of property without just compensation or an im-
pairment of the authority's contractual rights.
I
PRIVATIZATION: A SURVEY OF NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In recent years, commentators and policymakers have proposed
numerous plans to reduce the size and scope of activities presently
carried out by government. Frequently these proposals have been
advanced under the banner of "privatization." In this section, I
summarize the various meanings of privatization. I also examine the
rationales offered by advocates of privatization for reducing the size
of the public sector, and in some cases, shifting public sector re-
sponsibilities to the private sector.
Privatization typically refers to the shift of functions from the
state to the private sector.8 Importantly, privatization need not re-
sult in a reduction in government expenditure for social services. 9
7 See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MAR% L. REV. 449,
497-522 (1988) (examining legal consequences of privatization and suggesting that
courts will be hesitant to invalidate the shift of functions to the private sector on ground
that they violate individual entitlements). But cf. Robert C. Ellickson, The Legal Dimension
Of The Privatization Movement, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 157, 161-62 (1988) (although
courts are unlikely to find major constitutional barriers to privatization, in some contexts
there will be barriers to both the achievement of privatization and the terms of
privatization).
8 See Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE
STATE 15 (Sheila B. Kamerman & AlfredJ. Kahn eds. 1989). In the context of privatiza-
tion proposals, the private sector typically refers to all entities other than the state in-
cluding individuals and groups of individuals who band together to undertake activities,
regardless of whether they are motivated by profit; cf Marc Bendick, Jr., Privatizing the
Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An Idea to Be Taken Seriously, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE
WELFARE STATE, supra, at 97, 112-15 (comparing privatization to nonprofit and profit-
motivated firms).
9 Nevertheless, shrinking the size of the public sector, including its role in financ-
ing social services, is frequently one motive of advocates of privatization. See generally
881
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Privatization proposals are sometimes categorized according to
whether the state continues to fund production. "Government
load-shedding" occurs when the state divorces itself from both the
financing and the production of goods and services; "empowerment
of mediating institutions" refers to situations in which the state con-
tinues to finance public goods and services, but leaves their delivery
and production to the private sector.' 0
The most frequent justification for privatization is the utilitarian
concern of efficiency." According to this view, a primary, if not
overriding, objective of public policy is the maximization of aggre-
gate individual utility. To the extent that resources currently being
utilized one way can instead be used differently so as to increase
aggregate utility or output, the former use is inefficient. 12 A large
number of empirical studies that compare public and private sector
provision of goods and services conclude that the private sector is
the more efficient provider.' 3 Two reasons commonly offered to ex-
STUART M. BUTLER, MICHAEL SANERA & W. BRUCE WEINROD, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP
II: CONTINUING THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION (1984).
10 See Bendick, supra note 8, at 98. Examples of load-shedding include budget re-
ductions and user fees. Examples of empowerment of mediating institutions include
contracting out, vouchers and subsidies. The transfer of government assets to private
ownership combines aspects of both types of privatization. Privatization may be an un-
fortunate term for describing the shift of functions from the state to other entities, espe-
cially in circumstances where the state continues to fund production. In many senses,
the distinction between private and public is chimerical. Government is intimately in-
volved in most of the activities undertaken by so-called private actors. Private entities
and interests have great influence in the composition of government and the shaping of
policy. Indeed, distinguishing private from public functions and activities is difficult
and, in some instances, lacks content. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1101-1105 (1980) ("public" and "private" corporations share many
similarities; distinction designed to protect private property); Joan Williams, The Develop-
ment of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law (Book Review), 64 TEx. L. REV. 225
(1985) (examining historical roots of public/private distinction). Compare Robert C. El-
lickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1580 (1982) (imper-
fectly voluntary nature of city justifies some differential treatment of municipalities and
homeowners associations) with Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1590 (1982) (Ellickson's voluntary/involuntary distinction mir-
rors private/public distinction and should be rejected).
I I Privatization proposals also are supported by those who believe that individual
choice should be subordinated to collective decisionmaking only in limited circum-
stances. See Cass, supra note 7, at 462-63 (1988) (describing normative principles build-
ing upon the Lockean tradition).
12 The criterion of efficiency that I utilize in this Article is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
A proposed allocation of resources is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those who are made better
off by a change in the allocation of resources could compensate those who are made
worse off. To meet the requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, actual compensation
need not be paid. See GEORGE W. DOWNS & PATRICK D. LARKEY, THE SEARCH FOR Gov-
ERNMENT EFFICIENCY 7 (1986). For a discussion of alternative definitions of economic
efficiency, see FRANK H. STEPHEN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 41-63 (1988).
13 E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 111 (1982) ("those who believe on a
priori grounds that private services are best can find considerable support for their posi-
tion.");James T. Bennett & Manuel H. Johnson, Public versus Pivate Provision of Collective
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plain the apparent inefficiency of the public sector are the absence
of transferable property rights in government enterprise and the be-
lief that the structure of the political process tends to give special
interest groups disproportionate influence and leads elected offi-
cials and bureaucrats to maximize their personal utility rather than
the utility of the public.
A major difference between the private and public sectors is the
existence in the private sector of transferable property rights in the
residuum of enterprise. The existence of such profits, in theory,
provides a strong incentive for private entrepreneurs to minimize
costs and maximize productivity.' 4 In addition, in instances where
the ultimate owners of an enterprise delegate management to
agents, as in a corporation, the existence of property rights creates
an incentive for the owners to monitor carefully the activities of
managers to ensure that they are profit-maximizing.' 5 Even where
Goods and Services: Garbage Collection Revisited, 34 PUB. CHOICE 55, 61-62 (1979) (private
sector is more efficient than public sector); Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining,
Ownership And Performance In Competitive Environments: A Comparison Of The Performance of
Private, Mixed And State-Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 26 (1989) (mixed and state-
owned enterprises perform substantially worse than similar privately owned corpora-
tions); David G. Davies, The Efficiency Of Public Versus Private Firms, The Case of Australia's
Two Airlines, 14 J.L. & ECON. 149, 165 (1971) (private airline run more efficiently than
public owned airline); Paul W. MacAvoy & George S. McIsaac, The Performance and Man-
agement of United States Federal Government Corporations, in PRIVATIZATION AND STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES: LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA 77, 128
(Paul W. MacAvoy, et al., eds. 1989) (four public corporations operate at lower level of
effectiveness than private sector enterprise in cost containment and productivity); cf.
JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 78
(1989) ("In sum, when a well-specified contract in a competitive context can enforce
accountability, the presumption of superior private efficiency in delivering public serv-
ices holds true.");Janet Rothenberg Pack, Privatization and Cost Reduction, 22 PoL'Y Sci. 1,
22 (1989) (interviews with city and county officials show that cost savings from con-
tracting with private sector exist when services are labor intense and there is competi-
tion); see also infra text accompanying notes 93-119 (comparing public housing to
vouchers and housing allowances). But cf G. DowNs & P. LARKEY, supra note 12, at 49
(critiquing comparisons of private and public enterprise, but concluding that "[t]he re-
search, overall, provides some evidence that private firms are somewhat more efficient in
the delivery of certain services."); JOSEPH STGLrrz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
197, 210 (2d ed. 1988) (evidence that public sector is less efficient than private sector is
"limited").
14 See Louis De Alessi, Property Rights and Privatization, in PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZA-
TIoN 24, 31 (Steve H. Hanke ed. 1987) (public sector actors will not minimize costs in
similar manner as private sector entrepreneurs).
15 See CENTRO VELJANOVSKI, SELLING THE STATE 85 (1987) ("private ownership plus
remuneration by variable residual claims creates powerful incentives and a self-enforc-
ing system of monitoring of costs and performance"); Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REV. 777,
782 (1972) (person who receives residual rewards of firm will monitor productivity and
prevent shirking); Lawrence W. Lovik, Bureaucracy, Privatization, and the Supply of Public
Goods, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZING OF GOVERNMENT 23, 25 (Calvin A.
Kent ed. 1987) (entrepreneur is motivated to make advantageous exchanges because he
or she has property rights in a portion of the expected gain of the enterprise). But see
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individual property owners fail to monitor, the existence of a market
for corporate control provides a safeguard against inefficient man-
agement.1 6 Similar incentives for cost reduction and careful moni-
toring do not exist or exist in only an attenuated fashion in the
public sector.1 7 Individual taxpayers do not have a direct claim to
the surplus created by government. In addition, because a tax-
payer's interest in the government is not freely transferable, no mar-
ket for control exists to monitor efficiency."1
A second approach to explaining why government seems to act
in an inefficient manner examines how individual choices are aggre-
gated in majority rule, democratic political systems and the nature
of the incentives that motivate elected officials and bureaucrats.
Due to collective action problems, narrow self-interested groups,
frequently referred to as special interest groups,19 have an advan-
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
8-9 (1932) (separation of management from ownership reduces incentives for
efficiency).
16 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAsv. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Henry G.
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Starr,
supra note 8, at 28.
17 SeeJ. DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 51 ("The attenuation of ownership inherent in
public undertakings may slacken the entire chain of agency relationships binding citizens
with those who ultimately do the work."); Cass, supra note 7, at 482 (public monitoring is
less effective than private monitoring and will lead to higher agency costs). Additional
reasons why the public sector might be less efficient than the private sector are that
governments are usually not subject to the threat of bankruptcy and the pressures of
competition. SeeJ. STIGLrrz, supra note 13, at 199-201; JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YAR-
ROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 45-77 (1988); Cass, supra note 7, at 468.
Nevertheless, several empirical studies have compared private and public production of
goods and services in markets where competition existed and found that the public sec-
tor was still less efficient than the private sector. See supra note 13.
18 Some have also argued that private, as opposed to public, property rights pro-
mote the efficient use of resources due to the so-called tragedy of the commons. In the
tragedy of the commons metaphor, collectively owned property is inefficiently utilized
since the full costs and benefits of an individual's use of the property are not internal-
ized. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Never-
theless, unlike the collective property usually associated with the tragedy of the
commons, access to, as well as over- and under-utilization of, publicly held property can
be regulated by the state to result in an efficient level of use. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 187 (1988). Sub-optimal use of resources might
still occur due to the absence of public sector incentives to pursue efficiency and difficul-
ties in collecting sufficient information to determine efficient levels of utilization. In
addition, political factors might result in an inefficient level of regulation or pricing for
publicly held resources. See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra, at 189-90 (examples of
inefficient government regulation of publicly owned resources); MATTHEW L. SPrrzER,
SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 49-50 (1986) (examining abuses attributa-
ble to government regulation of the broadcast media).
19 For a discussion of the meaning of special interest as opposed to public interest,
see Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective On Civic Virtue Reforms of
the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-80 (1988).
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tage over diffuse majorities in influencing government.20 Individual
voters who favor a government policy or program benefitting a large
number of citizens often lack the incentive to organize and expend
resources in collecting information and lobbying public officials.
Typically, the costs associated with organizing large numbers of
only moderately interested voters are enormous. Because benefits
cannot be limited to those who organize, but instead must be shared
among a large number of citizens, each individual voter has an in-
centive to leave the expensive and time consuming task of political
organization to others and "free ride" on their efforts. Small
groups of intensely interested citizens, however, have much lower
organizational costs and are likely to have an impact on the legisla-
tive process that is disproportionate to their numbers. Special inter-
est groups can use this organizational advantage to influence the
political process and increase their wealth at the expense of the ma-
jority. This rent-seeking2 ' behavior results in inefficiencies associ-
ated both with the resources the interest groups expend in their
efforts to influence public officials as well as their successful diver-
sion of public resources to private interests.
In addition to rent-seeking, political economists have argued
that the public sector tends to be inefficient because elected repre-
sentatives and administrative officials face strong incentives to act
inefficiently. Based on their assumption that a legislator's primary
motivation is to win reelection, these theorists predict that public
programs will be designed to confer concentrated benefits on legis-
lative districts rather than to deal with public problems in an effi-
cient manner.22 In addition, administrative officials are thought to
pursue their private goals rather than the public interest by maxi-
20 See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
21 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ROBERT D. TOLLISON & GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3 (1980).
22 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 119-
262 (1962) (government allocations of goods and services are not guided solely by maxi-
mizing benefits and minimizing costs); JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS 46
(1974) (government mishandles public works projects by overestimating benefits and
underestimating costs); Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective On Congressional
Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. ScI. 245, 249 (1979) (representative government will act inef-
ficiently by enacting programs which provide for concentrated benefits to all legislative
districts). Several scholars also have suggested that majority rule voting systems may be
incapable of consistent or rational behavior. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (examining the logic of choice which re-
quires that social choice be responsive to desires of individuals); DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE 185-201 (1979) (presenting five postulates which operate when society
allocates commodities among individuals to maximize their collective welfare); Robert
Inman, Markets, Governments, And The "New" Political Economy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 647, 681-92 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 1987) (discussing
Arrow's Possibility Theorem).
885
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mizing the size and scope of their bureaus. 23
The indictments of the public sector offered by property rights
and public choice theorists are themselves subject to criticism. Even
though taxpayers do not possess freely transferable property rights
in government enterprise, they nonetheless have an interest in effi-
cient government operation. To the extent that government oper-
ates more efficiently, their tax burdens will be reduced. Property
rights theorists also tend to have an idealized model of the private
sector. Private sector enterprises, however, are observed to engage
in inefficient behavior which is often unchecked by the market for
corporate control.24 Public choice theorists, in turn, may overstate
the self-interest of voters and public officials. Little room is left for
altruistic or public-regarding behavior on behalf of either group. 25
Nevertheless, significant empirical evidence indicates that, on
the whole, the public sector does tend to be a less efficient provider
of goods and services than the private sector. The reasons offered
by property rights and public choice theorists seem to explain at
least part of the cause of this differential. However, most econo-
mists and political scientists would also agree that, at times, govern-
ment action is necessary not only to achieve efficiency, but also to
attain other objectives, such as the society's consensus of distribu-
tive fairness. The private sector may be unable to realize efficiency
due to market failures. Among the most commonly mentioned
causes of market failure are the existence of monopolies, public
23 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
36-42 (1973) (bureaucrats do not always maximize general welfare; instead they often
allocate goods and services according to personal interest); William Orzechowski, Eco-
nomic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions and Evidence, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS:
THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 229, 230 (Thomas E. Borcherding ed. 1977)
("[B]ureaucrats maximize utility by producing outputs above minimum costs."). Among
the reasons members of the bureaucracy may be free to maximize personal objectives is
the absence of readily available measures of performance and the insulation from termi-
nation provided by civil service laws. See J. STIGLrrz, supra note 13, at 202-03. The
insulation provided to public employees by the civil service laws may also promote effi-
cient government practices by enabling employees to administer their programs free
from threats of political retribution.
24 See generally J. VICKERS & G. YARROW, supra note 17, at 15-24;John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). In addition,
private sector inefficiency may be attributable to the existence of monopolies or oligopo-
lies. SeeJ. STIGLrTz, supra note 13, at 71-75.
25 See AMITAI ETZIONi, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 51-66
(1988) (citing evidence that people act unselfishly); Richard A. Musgrave, Leviathan
Cometh-Or Does He?, in TAX EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 77, 92 (Helen F. Ladd & T.
Nicholas Tideman, eds. 1981) ("Human motivation is too many-sided and complex to
be captured by the caricature of bureau-grabbing officials which permeates the Levia-
than literature."); Gary R. Orren, Beyond Self-Interest, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 13,
24-29 (Robert Reich ed. 1988) (people pursue goals other than self-interest); Starr, supra
note 8, at 31 (voters are capable of recognizing collective interest separate from their
own; checks and balances among branches of government will limit inefficiency).
886 [Vol. 75:878
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goods, externalities, incomplete markets and imperfect informa-
tion.26 Where a market failure exists, it may be necessary for the
public sector to correct it, using its powers of taxation, spending
and regulation. 27 Furthermore, even in instances where no market
failure exists, the public sector has a role in achieving objectives that
may have little to do with economic efficiency. For example,
although the strength of the conviction ebbs and flows over time,
most people would say that a legitimate role for government is the
redistribution of wealth.28 The coercive power of government is
usually thought to be necessary to achieve this objective.29
Many people committed to objectives other than economic effi-
ciency, such as income redistribution, tend to view the advocates of
privatization with a mixture of skepticism and hostility. Clearly, the
property rights and public choice theorists paint a somewhat bleak
picture of the public sector and may call into question the ability of
government to achieve worthwhile social objectives. In addition,
advocates of redistribution may, at least in some cases, justifiably
suspect that the proponents of privatization have a political agenda
that goes beyond efficient delivery of social services to shrinking the
level of government intervention in all facets of society.30 Some
may also suspect that there exists an ideological bias in privatization
to benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor.3'
Nevertheless, it would be shortsighted for those who believe, as
I do, in redistribution of income to reject out of hand the insights of
those advocating privatization based on a suspicion of ulterior mo-
tives. To the contrary, proponents of privatization provide us with
the tools to analyze how social services can best be delivered.
Although efficiency may not always be the sole or overriding objec-
tive of public policy, once a particular social objective is chosen, it
26 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 52-54 (2d ed. 1988);J. STiGLrrZ, supra note
13, at 71-80; Inman, supra note 22, at 653-63.
27 SeeJ. STIGLrrz, supra note 13, at 76. Some economists, however, argue that there
is little reason to expect public sector intervention in many market failures to bring
about a more efficient utilization of resources. See EDWIN S. MILLS, THE BURDEN OF
GOVERNMENT 31-43 (1986).
28 See, e.g., E. MILLS, supra note 27, at 60-61 (modest redistributive program could
command near unanimous support). But see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTO-
PrA 149-231 (1974) (extensive state is not justified based on a theory of distributive
justice).
29 JOHN F. DUE & ANN F. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 121 (1973) ("In the absence of governmental intervention, no redistri-
bution will take place because of the public good nature of the income distribution.").
30 See generally MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP III, supra note 2.
31 See Alan Walker, The Political Economy of Privatisation, in PRIVATISATION AND THE
WELFARE STATE 19, 28 (Julien Le Grand & Ray Robinson eds. 1984) ("Privatization of
the social services has an important part to play in the recapitalization of capitalism both
in reducing the size of the public sector and in providing ready-made markets for the
private sector.").
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would seem difficult to argue against maximizing the benefits
generated by government intervention. In some instances, the gov-
ernment will be the most efficient service provider; in other circum-
stances, however, a larger number of people could be assisted by
greater reliance on the private sector. In the next section of this
Article, I will turn to the appropriate manner in which federal hous-
ing subsidies should be delivered to low income households.
II
FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE IN THE 1990s: INCREASING
RELIANCE ON PRIVATE SECTOR DELIVERY
The housing needs of low and moderate income households
have changed during the twentieth century. Although fewer people
live in substandard dwellings today than at any time in our history,
many households pay a burdensome proportion of their incomes for
rent. This section examines the role of the public sector in dealing
with the housing problems of lower income households. At the out-
set, I set forth a rationale for public sector intervention in housing
markets. I next move from the general to the specific and address
how the federal government should deliver housing subsidies.32 In
particular, I examine the public housing program and compare it to
housing allowance and voucher initiatives. I conclude that, on the
whole, the federal government should focus its efforts on subsi-
dizing low income demand for housing, rather than directly sup-
porting the production of housing units. Nevertheless, direct
provision of housing by the public sector may still be justified in
certain circumstances, such as artificially constrained housing mar-
kets and markets that evidence housing discrimination against
minorities.
A. A Rationale For Government Intervention In Housing
Markets
Over the past fifty years, substantial progress has been made in
improving the quality of American housing. According to census
data, the proportion of households living in overcrowded or sub-
standard dwellings has dramatically decreased. 33 Even though over-
32 In this Article, I focus on federal spending programs rather than police power
regulations. Although the federal government occasionally intervenes to regulate hous-
ing markets, see, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3631 (West 1977 & Supp.
1990); Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West 1989),
typically it leaves such intervention to the states and localities. Nevertheless, the ration-
ale I develop for government intervention in housing markets may also justify certain
forms of police power regulation, either as a substitute for or as an adjunct to spending
programs.
33 From 1950 to 1983, the proportion of urban housing units which were occupied
888 [Vol. 75:878
1990] PRIVATIZING FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE 889
all quality of housing, including low income housing,34 has
increased throughout the century, problems associated with the
concentration of low income housing remain. Increasingly, low in-
come households are relegated to inner city neighborhoods, far
from opportunities for economic advancement, but in close proxim-
ity to crime, drugs and despair.3 5 Those unable to afford rent also
face severe housing problems. According to a 1988 study, contract
and gross rents have respectively increased sixteen percent and
fourteen percent faster than the rate of inflation between 1981 and
1987.36 Earnings, especially those of low income households, have
by more than one person per room declined from 13.3 to 3.5%. In addition, from 1950
to 1970, the proportion of urban housing units characterized by the United States Cen-
sus as dilapidated or lacking complete plumbing facilities fell from 21.9 to 5.5%. See
JAMES HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 313 (3d ed. 1987); see alsoJAMES
W. HUGHES & GEORGE STERNLIEB, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN HOUSING 180 (1987)
(there has been a substantial upgrading of housing quality); RANDALL JOHNSTON
POZDENA, THE MODERN ECONOMICS OF HOUSING 138-39 (1988) (housing quality has im-
proved and overcrowding has declined over last thirty to forty years). According to a
recent report prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, only seven percent of all
households live in dwellings in need of rehabilitation. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE, CURRENT HOUSING PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE FEDERAL RESPONSES 10 (1988). But see
MARY K. NENNO & CECIL E. SEARS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980's 29 (there has been
little shift in the actual number of physically inadequate or overcrowded units since
1975). Despite the improvement in overall quality, nonwhite households live in signifi-
cantly lower quality dwellings than white households. See R. POZDENA, supra, at 141.
34 Nevertheless, the proportion of very low income renter households living in
dwellings in need of rehabilitation was 19% in 1985. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE, supra note 33, at 18. A very low income household is one that earns less than or
equal to 50% of an area's median income for households of similar size. Id. at 12.
35 See DENNIS R.JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 162-63 (3d ed. 1988) (for the period 1950-1980, median income of central
city families as a percentage of family median income outside central cities fell from 95%
to 75% for six northern and midwestern metropolitan areas and from 99% to 85% for
six southern and western metropolitan areas); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987)
(examining the decline of American cities and the changing class structure of American
ghettos); Mark Alan Hughes, Misspeaking Truth To Power: A Geographical Perspective On The
"Underclass" Fallacy, 65 ECON. GEO. 187, 194 (1989) (from 1970 to 1980 there was a net
increase of 165 "impacted ghetto" census tracts in 46 metropolitan statistical areas con-
taining the 50 largest American cities); Richard P. Nathan & Charles F. Adams, Jr., Four
Perspectives on Urban Hardship, 104 POL. ScI Q. 483, 502-03 (1989) (proportion of urban
poor families living in "poverty area neighborhoods" increased from 39.9% to 56.8%
from 1980 to 1986); Gregory R. Weiher, Rumors Of The Demise Of The Urban Crisis Are
Greatly Exaggerated, I lJ. URB. AFr. 225, 237 (1989) (from 1970 to 1980, population living
in high poverty areas increased by 69%; in extreme poverty areas there was a 161%
increase in population); The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives, William Julius Wil-
son ed., in 501 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE 8-192 (1989) (articles by various social scientists examining the problems of the
"underclass").
36 See WILLIAM C. APGAR, JR., THE NATION'S HOUSING: A REVIEW OF PAST TRENDS
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR HOUSING IN AMERICA 8 (M.I.T. Housing Policy Project
HP# 1, 1988). Contract rent is the monthly amount paid by tenants for housing serv-
ices; gross rent includes contract rent plus fuel, water, sewerage and utility payments.
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not kept pace with the increase in rents, requiring many households
to pay excessive proportions of their incomes for rent.3 7
If, as most analysts agree, the major housing problem facing
low income households today is one of affordability, why do public
policymakers treat the difficulties faced by low income renters as
housing problems rather than as problems of income distribution?38
If the problems faced by these households could be solved by in-
creased income, why not provide low income households with un-
restricted income supplements rather than subsidies earmarked for
housing expenditure? If the market for housing were free of market
imperfections, and the only housing problem of low income house-
holds was affordability, elementary welfare economics would indi-
Apgar's method of computing the change in real rents includes an adjustment for
changes in housing quality, which explains the differences between his estimates and
those of other studies based upon the Consumer Price Index. See id. at 7-8.
37 See id. at 31-32. According to Apgar, the median ratio of gross rental expendi-
tures to income (adjusted for inflation) increased from 21% in 1970 to 30% in 1987.
Among young, single-parent families with children, the ratio increased from 34.9% in
1974 to 58.4% in 1987. A widely used rule of thumb suggests that housing expendi-
tures are excessive if they exceed 30 percent of income. See id. at 32, 35. But cf. TERRY S.
LANE, WHAT FAMILIES SPEND FOR HOUSING--THE ORIGINS AND USES OF THE "RULES OF
THUMB" 53-55 (1977) (criticizing use of rent-to-income ratios). Although housing econ-
omists disagree about whether increasing rent-to-income burdens are attributable, in
part, to the consumption of better quality housing, compare William C. Apgar, Jr. Recent
Trends In Housing Quality And Affordability: A Reassessment in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990S
37, 59-61 (S. Rosenberry & C. Hartman, eds. 1989) (constant-quality rents increased
from 1970 to 1980) with John C. Weicher, Housing Quality: Measurement and Progress in
HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990s 9, 29 (S. Rosenberry & C. Hartman, eds. 1989) (constant-
quality rents have risen less than income in postwar period), they nevertheless agree that
affordability problems have increased in recent years. See Apgar, supra, at 56-57;
Weicher, supra, at 28-29; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 33, at 10, 16
(80% of very low income renter households pay over 30% of their income for rent; 41%
of very low income households pay 50% of their income for housing expenses); FORD
FOUNDATION, AFFORDABLE HOUSING: THE YEARS AHEAD 12-13 (1989) (low income fami-
lies have been squeezed by decline in real income and increase in housing costs); NA-
TIONAL HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
HOUSING TASK FORCE 6 (1988) (as of 1983 almost half of all low income households paid
more than half their incomes for rent); NATIONAL Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION, THE
Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS AND HOMELESSNESS: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL POLICIES
1981-89 1 (1988) (between 1970 and 1983, median rents increased at twice the rate of
median income); EJ. Dionne, Jr., Poor Paying More For Their Shelter, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18,
1989, at A18, col. 1 (63% of poor pay over half of their income for housing). But see
Peter D. Salins, Toward A Permanent Housing Problem, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22, 25 (Fall
1986) (criticizing reliance on rent to income ratios as indicators of housing hardship).
For some households, increased housing costs have led to homelessness. See generally
PETER H. Rossl, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 181-85
(1989); Homelessness in America-The Need For Permanent Housing: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Housing and Community Development of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
38 This Article proceeds on the underlying assumption that it is both proper and
desirable for the government to engage in redistributive activities. I do not, except in
passing, justify my normative and ethical bias in favor of redistribution.
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cate that an unrestricted income supplement such as a negative
income tax would be the most efficient policy. Earmarked subsidies
and in-kind redistribution are generally considered to be inefficient,
since many households would not, if left to their own choices, spend
each additional dollar of income on a dollar's worth of housing con-
sumption. 39 Instead, households would typically choose to spend
only a portion of the increased income on housing and the remain-
der on other consumption items such as food and clothing. By pro-
viding low income households with in-kind assistance, the public
sector's expenditure presumably results in less overall utility than
would an unrestricted transfer payment. 40
The housing market, however, is not free from market imper-
fections and artificial constraints on supply. Tying public subsidies
to housing is justified in circumstances where they can be utilized
efficiently to overcome these market failures and constraints.
Although most economists believe that housing markets are gener-
ally competitive with a large number of actual and potential con-
sumers and sellers,4 1 absent government intervention, the housing
market may fail to generate an optimal amount of housing. The
supply of housing, although quite elastic in the long run, is relatively
inelastic in the short run because of the length of time required for
site selection, financing and construction. 42 In addition, government
39 Recent empirical evidence suggests that a household's income elasticity of de-
mand with respect to housing expenditure is less than one. SeeJ. HEILBURN, supra note
33, at 307 (describing estimates of income elasticity of demand as low as .14); EDWIN S.
MILLS & BRUCE W. HAMILTON, URBAN ECONOMICS 193 (1989) (discussing income elastic-
ity of demand for housing); David J. Ellwood & A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Empirical Recon-
ciliation of Micro and Grouped Estimates of the Demandfor Housing, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 199,
205 (1979) (income elasticity of demand for housing is "somewhat over 0.8"). Income
elasticity of demand for housing is defined as the percentage change in housing expend-
itures that occurs as income increases by one percent.
40 In addition, in-kind transfer programs typically have higher administrative costs
than income transfers. See H. ROSEN, supra note 26, at 166.
41 J. HEILBRUN, supra note 33, at 303 n.5 (view that housing markets are competitive
is "widely accepted"); WILLIAM GRIGSBY, MORTON BARATZ & DUNCAN MACLENNAN, SHEL-
TER SUBSIDIES FOR Low INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 25 (U. of Pa., Dep't of City & Reg. Plan-
ning Res. Rpt. Series No. 3, 1985) (monopolistic market structures are not usually
present in housing markets). But see JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPLEBAUM,
RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 106 (1988) (rental markets are not competitive where
ownership is professionalized and vacancy rates low).
42 See E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 39, at 194; R. POZDENA, supra note 33, at
36. To alleviate the short-run supply elasticity constraint, government would have to be
able to build or stimulate the construction of housing in reaction to changed market
conditions at a quicker pace than the private sector. Certain factors might favor govern-
ment construction, especially when the type of housing to be constructed is uncon-
troversial. See infra note 132 (public construction may be more expeditious due to public
sector control over land use and approvals process). Nevertheless, government plans to
build low income housing are often met by community opposition that might make the
time required for construction longer than for housing constructed by private sector
developers. See infra note 132.
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regulation impedes the supply of housing, especially for low income
households. Zoning and land use regulations, health and safety or-
dinances, as well as rent control and security of tenure laws, may
restrict the supply of housing.43 Furthermore, discrimination
against minorities in the housing market might limit their ability to
purchase housing in certain neighborhoods.
Public intervention in the housing market may also be justified
by the problem of substandard housing. Deteriorated housing
sometimes poses an externality problem.44 The existence of a dilapi-
dated structure can reduce the value of neighboring homes and may
lead to disinvestment in the neighborhood. Because the owner of
the deteriorated structure does not have to bear all of the costs gen-
erated by his or her property, public intervention such as slum clear-
ance or renovation assistance might be appropriate. 45 In much the
same way that a deteriorated building might be considered a nega-
tive externality, a high quality building might be a positive external-
ity or public good. The existence of such a structure might increase
values and confidence in the community. Private entrepreneurs
might avoid making the investment since they would receive only a
portion of its benefit, with nearby owners free-riding on the
remainder.
Another justification for government intervention in the hous-
ing market, as opposed to pure income assistance, is based on non-
economic factors. As Tobin has noted, although Americans typi-
cally accept inequality in most aspects of life, there is a rough con-
sensus that "certain specific scarce commodities should be
distributed less unequally than the ability to pay for them. ' '46 Soci-
43 Subsidy programs that preempt local ordinances may promote efficient housing
markets, but may be politically impractical. The federal government has been exceed-
ingly reluctant to enact housing programs which interfere with the enforcement of state
and local police powers. See Martin Tolchin, Conferees Dropping Penalty for Rent Control,
N.Y. Times, July 22, 1981, at Al, col. I (House-Senate Conference drops Senate-passed
provision to withhold housing funds from jurisdictions with rent control).
44 An activity of one person that affects the welfare of another in a way that is
outside the market is called an externality. See H. ROSEN, supra note 26, at 53.
45 See R. POZDENA, supra note 33, at 145-46 (discussing neighborhood effects cre-
ated by deteriorated housing); JEROME ROTHENBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF URBAN
RENEWAL 40 (1967) (discussing externalities present in residential neighborhoods); Neil
S. Mayer, Rehabilitation Decisions in Rental Housing: An Empirical Analysis, 10J. URB. ECON.
76, 92 (1981) (empirical evidence indicates that neighborhood effects have an impact on
landlord rehabilitation expenditures). But see E. MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 39, at
230 (empirical studies have failed to find systematic negative effect on the price of single
family homes caused by "undesirable" neighboring land uses, although absence of such
a finding may be due to methodological limitations). The problems associated with sub-
standard housing may also be addressed by strict code enforcement. See ANTHONY
DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 164-68 (1981) (advocating selective
code enforcement).
46 James Tobin, On Limiting The Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & ECON. 263, 264
892 [Vol. 75:878
1990] PRIVATIZING FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE 893
ety may be justified in preferring a minimum entitlement to hous-
ing, despite the desires of the recipient, for several reasons. People
who prefer other goods and services to a minimum level of shelter
may lack sufficient information or be unable to assess rationally the
true worth of decent housing, thereby justifying societal paternal-
ism. Furthermore, especially in light of the increasing number of
children born to unmarried, teenage parents, efforts to provide a
minimum level of housing consumption may be justified as neces-
sary to protect those who do not themselves have the power to make
expenditure decisions.47 In addition, the knowledge that people are
not living in desperately deteriorated and unhealthful accommoda-
tions may itself bring taxpayers positive utility and therefore serve
as a consumption item for the donors48 rather than the donees.49
B. Public Housing and Housing Policy
The argument that government programs to provide housing
assistance to lower income households are justified on grounds of
market failure, supply constraints or societal consensus does not
(1970). Tobin calls this norm "specific egalitarianism." See id. The concept of specific
egalitarianism is closely related to the concept of "merit goods" which is used to de-
scribe commodities that should be provided by the public sector even if market actors do
not demand them. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13
(1959) (subsidized housing is a "merit want").
47 The concern that children be well-housed has become particularly acute in re-
cent years. Increasingly, lower income households are composed of a single parent with
children. In many instances the parent is a woman who is still an adolescent. See W.
WILSON, supra note 35, at 71-72 (46%o of all poor families and 71% of all poor black
families were headed by a single woman in 1982). The rent burden for these house-
holds is especially severe. See Eugenie L. Birch, The Unsheltered Woman: Definition and
Needs, in THE UNSHELTERED WOMAN: WOMEN AND HOUSING IN THE 80's 21, 35 (Eugenie
L. Birch ed. 1985) (female-headed households with children are twice as likely to have a
problem with housing quality and three times more likely to have an affordability prob-
lem than other Americans). But cf. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 539,
572-73 (arguing against negative stereotype of unwed, black mothers).
48 See W. GRIGSBY, M. BARATE & D. MACLENNAN, supra note 41, at 53 (choice of
housing subsidy is tied to donors' utility functions); Henry J. Aaron & George H. Von
Furstenberg, The Inefficiency Of Transfers In Kind- The Case of Housing Assistance, 9 WEST.
ECON. J. 184 (1971) (tied subsidies for housing may be due to preferences of donors);
Richard A. Musgrave, Policies of Housing Support: Rationale and Instruments, in 1 HOUSING
IN THE SEVENTIES: WORYING PAPERS 215, 222 (U.S. Dep't of HUD, 1976) (high income
households may derive special satisfaction from use of tax dollars for housing).
49 I believe that there is nothing inappropriate with members of society determin-
ing that impoverished living conditions violate their ethical or aesthetic sensibilities and
conditioning assistance to citizens upon their elimination. I recognize that at a certain
point, such intervention into the lives of beneficiaries of public largesse may lead to
important ethical and legal questions. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984) (analyzing
unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ.
733 (1964) (government conditions on distribution of largesse may limit recipient's con-
stitutional rights). Nevertheless, requiring a person who receives public largesse to use
the funds to improve his or her housing does not, at least for me, cross this line.
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lead to a simple answer to the question of how that assistance
should be designed. Typically, housing policies are characterized as
either supply- or demand-oriented. Programs in which the govern-
ment supports the construction of new dwellings, either by building
them itself or by subsidizing developers, are enacted to directly in-
crease the supply of housing. Programs that provide the recipients
of assistance with the funds to purchase housing services increase
the demand for housing, and indirectly, its supply. In this section, I
describe and compare public housing, a supply-oriented program,
with housing certificates and allowances, a demand-oriented sub-
sidy. I contend that in the future, the public sector should primarily
subsidize demand, leaving the construction of additional housing to
the private sector. Nevertheless, construction of public housing
may be desirable under certain market conditions, including those
markets subject to artificial entry barriers and discrimination.
1. A Short History of Public Housing
Since the mid-1930s, the federal government has funded the
construction of housing for low income households. New Deal
agencies such as the Public Works Administration bought land,
cleared slums and built almost 22,000 housing units. 50 Direct fed-
eral provision of housing was initially dealt a blow in 1935 when a
federal appeals court upheld a lower court ruling that the federal
government could not use its power of eminent domain to condemn
sites for housing projects because housing was not a "public pur-
pose." 5 1 In 1937, however, Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall
Housing Act of 1937, establishing the public housing program.52
Under the Act, public housing would be built by local public hous-
ing authorities ("PHAs") 53 rather than by the federal government.
50 See GWENDOLYN WRIGHT, BUILDING THE DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HOUSING
IN AMERICA 225 (1981).
51 United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
296 U.S. 567 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936).
52 Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1437(a)-(j) (1982)).
53 A public housing authority is a local municipal corporation created pursuant to
state enabling legislation for the purpose of constructing, owning and operating housing
for low income households. Typically, a PHA is governed by a board of commissioners
appointed by the mayor and city council of the jurisdiction in which it is located. The
administration of the PHA is usually vested in an executive or managing director and his
or her staff. At present there are 3,415 PHAs operating in the United States. See gener-
ally CHARLES E. DAYE, DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 132-35 (2d ed. 1989); EUGENEJ. MEEHAN, PUBLIC HOUSING
POLICY: CONVENTION VERSUS REALITY 17-19 (1975); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOUSING
& REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, THE MANY FACES OF PUBLIC HOUSING 27-32 (1989); Hart-
man & Carr, Housing Authorities Reconsidered, 35 AMER. INST. PLANNERS J. 10 (1969). For
further discussion of the legal nature of PHAs, see infra text accompanying notes 211-
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In addition to concerns of comity, the program utilized PHAs be-
cause several state courts had held that cities and states had the
power to condemn property for housing.54 Under the program, a
PHA and the federal government execute an Annual Contributions
Contract ("ACC")55 which sets forth the parties' rights and obliga-
tions. The PHA funds the purchase of land and the construction of
housing by issuing long term bonds, typically with a forty-year ma-
turity. The federal government undertakes an obligation to make all
debt service payments on the bonds, effectively subsidizing all capi-
tal costs. 56 The PHA, in turn, obligates itself to operate the public
housing in a manner consistent with federal statutes and regulations
during the term of the ACC. The municipality in which the project
is located is required to grant an exemption from real property taxes
for the housing development. Unlike housing built by the Public
Works Administration, public housing was, from the start, limited to
low income households. 57 Due to the onset of World War II, only a
modest number of units were built under the 1937 Housing Act.58
In 1949, however, Congress passed the Housing Act of 194959
which provided federal subsidies for slum clearance and urban rede-
velopment. 60 As part of the Act, Congress authorized the construc-
tion of an additional 810,000 public housing units and established
the national housing policy of"[a] decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family...." 6 1 It was not until 1972,
however, that all of the housing units authorized by the 1949 Act
54 See, e.g. New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153
(1936); see also Myres S. McDougal & Addison A. Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing:
An Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE LJ. 42 (1942);Jane Lang McGrew & Ana Fabregas, The
Housing Act of 1937: Legal Origins, 44J. HOUSING 156, 157 (1987).
55 Consolidated Annual Contributions Agreement (November 1969).
56 Since the mid-1980s, the federal government has also directly loaned funds and
provided PHAs with grants to fund the construction of public housing, thereby eliminat-
ing the need for the issuance of bonds by PHAs. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437b(c)(1);
1437c(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
57 To qualify for public housing, households had to earn an income at least 20%
below the bracket that could afford the least expensive private housing. See G. WRIGHT,
supra note 50, at 227-28.
58 From 1937 to 1948, 117,000 public housing units had been constructed with
25,000 additional units deferred because of the war. SeeJAMEs RUSSELL PRESCOTT, Eco-
NOMIC ASPECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 24 (1974).
59 Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1452(b) (Supp. V 1987).
60 For critical analyses of the urban renewal program, see generally, MARTIN AN-
DERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL 1949-1962
(1964); HERBERTJ. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS 305-35 (1962); J. ROTHENBERG, supra
note 45; URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY (James Q. Wilson ed.
1966); see also infra text accompanying notes 108-17.
61 Pub L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
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were actually completed. 62 Today, approximately 1.3 million units
of public housing exist in the United States.63
From its inception, public housing was controversial. In the
1930s, the private real estate lobby alleged that the program was
socialistic and wasteful.64 Projects were frequently segregated by
race and built in less desirable neighborhoods where their presence
would not be "offensive" to community residents. 65 Public housing
was originally created for temporary occupancy by the "submerged
middle class." 66 As soon as residents could get themselves on their
feet, they were expected to move elsewhere. During the 1950s,
however, the socioeconomic character of public housing changed.
Federal government policies and programs such as mortgage insur-
ance, tax preferences for homeownership and highway construction
subsidized the movement of middle and moderate income house-
holds out of the city to the suburbs. At roughly the same time, black
migration from the South to northern cities accelerated. 67 As manu-
facturing jobs followed the migration of households to suburban lo-
cations, central cities increasingly became home to low income and
black households. 68 Public housing no longer served as a temporary
haven for upwardly mobile households, but instead became a per-
manent home to a very poor and disproportionately nonwhite
population.
As the income of public housing residents plummeted and the
age of public housing projects increased, the rents charged by PHAs
to cover operating expenses became increasingly burdensome.
Some PHAs deferred maintenance due to shortages of funds. 69 In
1969, Congress's action to assist tenants by limiting maximum rents
62 See J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Direct Federal Housing Assistance, in FED-
ERAL HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 187, 195 (J. Paul Mitchell ed. 1985).
63 COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES, PUBLIC HOUSING TODAY 5
(rev. ed. 1988). Public housing exists in over 3,200 localities. See id.
64 G. WRIGHT, supra note 50, at 220-21; Fenna Pit & Willem van Vliet, Public Housing
in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 199, 206 (Elizabeth Huttman & Willem van Vliet eds. 1988).
65 See infra note 134.
66 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 642, 648
(1966) ("The projects were [built] for poor but honest workers-the members of the
submerged middle class .. ").
67 See DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE UR-
BAN GHETrO 45-66 (1984) (discussing migration of blacks to northern cities from south-
em agricultural regions during and after World War II).
68 For analyses of how suburbanization contributed to the crisis of the inner city
and population changes within public housing, see generally, KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASSFRONTIER 190-245 (1985); PatrickJ. Ashton, Urbanization and the Dynamics of
Suburban Development Under Capitalism, in MARXISM AND THE METROPOLIS 54 (William K.
Tabb & Larry Sawers 2d ed. 1984).
69 See IRVING WELFELD, WHERE WE LIVE: THE AMERICAN HOME AND THE SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE, FROM SLUMS TO SUBURBS 191 (1988).
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chargeable by PHAs further added to PHA burdens. 70 The federal
government enacted subsidy programs to help PHAs pay for operat-
ing and modernization expenses. Neither of these subsidies, how-
ever, was fully funded, and many PHAs further cut back on
maintenance which led to structural deterioration 71 and, in some ex-
treme cases, the demolition of uninhabitable buildings.72
2. Public Housing Today
At present, there are over 1.3 million units of public housing in
the United States, housing 3.5 million people.73 Public housing
constitutes 1.5% of the nation's housing stock. 74 The average an-
nual income of households is $6,539. 75 Approximately 60% of non-
elderly resident households have no one employed and half receive
Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 76 Thirty-eight percent of
such households are composed of elderly persons.77 Data from a
1986 survey of PHAs indicate that 60% of all families in public
housing are headed by blacks and an additional 24% by hispanics.78
Over one-half of public housing developments are comprised
70 The Brooke Amendment limited rents to 25%o of income. See Pub. L. No. 91-152
§ 213, 83 Stat. 3898 (1970). This ceiling has since been raised to 30%o. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437a(a) (West Supp. 1989).
71 See Eugene J. Meehan, The Evolution of Public Housing Policy, in FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 287, 297 (J. Paul Mitchell ed. 1985) ("The
fiscal arrangements made by Congress were the most important single factor in the
eventual breakdown of the conventional public housing program."); Pit & van Vliet,
supra note 64, at 216 (federal government restricted funds for modernization and rou-
tine repairs).
72 See EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE QUALITY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING: PROGRAMMED
FAILURE IN PUBLIC HOUSING (1979) (discussing the experience of the St. Louis Housing
Authority and the demolition of the Pruitt Igoe project); Lee Rainwater, The Lessons of
Pruitt-Igoe, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 597 (Jon Pynoos, Robert Schafer & Chester W.
Hartman eds. 2d ed. 1980) (discussing problems of relying upon public housing pro-
gram to improve lives of low income black households); Alfonso A. Narvaez, Newark Rips
Down Its Projects, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1987, at 25, col. 2 (Newark plans to demolish one-
third of its public housing). In addition to insufficient maintenance, many of the
problems that have plagued some public housing developments are attributable to im-
proper design and construction. See, e.g., E. MEEHAN, supra note 53, at 174-75 (catalog-
ing design and construction flaws of public housing including shortage of large units,
lack of amenities, low quality of materials used in construction and high density); Cathe-
rine Bauer, Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, 106 ARCHrrIECTURAL FORUM 139 (1957) (ad-
vocate of public housing criticizes physical layout and conditions of housing); Pit and
van Vliet, supra note 64, at 214 (lack of public space deprived citizens of opportunities
for establishing neighborly relationships).
73 See COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES, supra note 63, at 5, 11.
74 Rachel G. Bratt, The Controversy and Contribution, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
HOUSING 335, 342 (Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman & Ann Meyerson eds. 1986).
75 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, supra note
53, at 2. This figure is based on a 1989 survey of 202 PHAs.
76 COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES, supra note 63, at 13.
77 Id.
78 Mark L. Matulef, This is Public Housing, 44 J. HOUSING 175, 176 (1987).
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of single family homes or garden apartments. 79 In addition, one
quarter of all units are located in suburban locations.8 0 Although
several public housing developments have serious structural and so-
cial problems,8 ' most studies indicate that public housing is in much
better condition than its popular image would indicate.8 2 A 1980
study of the physical condition of public housing commissioned by
the federal government concluded that while the vast majority of the
housing stock was in good condition, seven and two-fifths percent of
all units had "chronic problems."8 3 Another study that examined
social, financial, managerial and physical problems concluded that
only fifteen percent of all public housing units were troubled. 4 Fur-
thermore, surveys indicate that residents of public housing are quite
satisfied with their living conditions,8 5 and that most public housing
79 COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES, supra note 63, at 5.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, In Newark's High-Rises, A Desperate Wait, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 17, 1989, at B 1, col. 2; James C. McKinley, Constant Reality in a Project: Fear of Violent
Drug Gangs, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at Al, coI. 1.
82 See Mary Jo Huth, An Examination Of Public Housing In The United States After Forty
Years, 8J. Soc. & SOC. WELFARE 471, 482 (1988) ("It is amazing, for example, how much
has been written about the infamous Pruitt-Igoe and other notorious high crime projects
and how little publicity has been given to the many smaller projects, consisting of highly
attractive clusters of one- and two-story townhouses and garden apartments surrounded
by lawns, trees, and playgrounds, which uninformed passersby would not even recog-
nize as public housing.").
83 PERKINS & WILL, AN EVALUATION OF THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PUBLIC HOUS-
ING STOCK 14 (1980). Among the chronic problems were vandalism, age, poor manage-
ment and deferred maintenance. See id. at 13.
84 RONALD JONES, DAVID KAMINSKT & MICHAEL ROANHOUSE, PROBLEMS AFFECTING
Low-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS 3 (1979). Troubled projects were disproportion-
ately composed of buildings inhabited by families. Seventy-one percent of all public
housing was designed for families, yet of those projects characterized as troubled, 92%
were inhabited by families. Public housing projects inhabited primarily by elderly per-
sons were under-represented in the troubled category-29% of all units were designed
for elderly households, yet only 8% of the troubled projects were inhabited by the eld-
erly. See id. at 42; see also Friedman, supra note 66, at 654 (suggesting that the success of
elderly public housing is at least partially attributable to the fact that many residents are
white, middle class people who are accepted by their neighbors).
In addition, a 1988 inventory of modernization needs prepared for the federal gov-
ernment estimated that the average cost of capital repairs and replacements for public
housing units is $7,392 and the estimated total cost is $9,307,000,000. The report
noted that "[r]elatively few public housing developments are in need of substantial
structural changes to ensure their continued viability." See ABT ASSOCIATES, STUDY OF
THE MODERNIZATION NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING STOCK Xi, xiv, xxi
(1988); see also John E. Farley, Has Public Housing Gotten A Bum Rap?: The Incidence of Crime
in St. Louis Public Housing Developments, 14 ENV'T. & BEHAV. 443, 471 (1982) (empirical
evidence suggests crime rates in public housing developments are not higher than in
central cities as a whole).
85 See GUIDO FRANCESCATO, SUE WEIDEMANN, JAMES R. ANDERSON & RICHARD CHE-
NOWETH, RESIDENT'S SATISFACTION IN HUD-AsSISTED HOUSING: DESIGN AND MANAGE-
MENT FACTORS §§ 3.1 (1978) (66%o of respondents to survey were satisfied with their
homes in public housing and HUD-assisted housing); ALVIN RABUSHKA & WILLIAM G.
WEISSERT, CASEWORKERS OR POLICE? How TENANTS SEE PUBLIC HOUSING 40-41 (1977)
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authorities have extremely long waiting lists.86
3. The Future Role of Public Housing in Federal Housing Assistance
Public housing is only one of several housing programs enacted
by the federal government to assist low income households. Since
the mid-1970s, the government has increasingly relied on the pri-
vate sector to deliver housing assistance. One supply-oriented ap-
proach initiated by the federal government in 1974 is called the
Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation Pro-
gram.8 7 Under this program, the government subsidizes the rents of
tenants who live in new or substantially renovated structures owned
by non-profit or profit-motivated developers. The subsidy, which is
tied to the units in these structures, is guaranteed for a period of
twenty to forty years and covers the difference between the amount
paid by the tenants (usually thirty percent of adjusted income) and a
fair market rent based upon the developer's capital and operating
costs.88 In 1974, Congress also enacted one of a series of demand-
oriented subsidy programs called the Section 8 Existing Housing
Certificate Program.8 9 Under this program, participating house-
holds are issued a certificate that enables them to rent dwellings
owned by private landlords. 90 Provided that they lease homes that
meet minimum quality standards and that do not cost more than the
(survey of tenants in Wilmington, Delaware public housing showed elderly households
had virtually no complaints and 60% of family households had no problems except for
noise); George S. Rent & Clyda S. Rent, Low Income Housing: Factors Related to Residential
Satisfaction, 10 ENV'T & BEHAV. 459, 469-73 (1978) (90% or more of residents surveyed
in low income housing projects (including public housing) in South Carolina expressed
satisfaction with neighborhoods and housing units). But see Raymond J. Burby & Wil-
liam A. Rohe, Deconcentration of Public Housing: Effects on Residents' Satisfaction with Their
Living Environments and Their Fear of Crime, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 117, 127 (1989) (survey of
residents of eight public housing projects showed relatively high levels of dissatisfaction
with living environments).
86 The average wait for a public housing unitis approximately 13 months. For nine
percent of all PHAs the average waiting period exceeds three years. See MICHAEL A.
STEGMAN, THE ROLE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN A REVITALIZED NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY 2
(M.I.T. Housing Policy Project HP #18, April 1988). Due to the large disparity be-
tween the rents charged for public housing and those charged for housing in the private
market, long waiting lists may prove little.
87 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 8(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633, 662 (1976).
88 As of September 30, 1987, approximately 794,000 households have been as-
sisted under the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation Program.
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 33, at 32-33. No new commitments have
been made since 1983, except for handicapped and elderly housing. See id. at 32.
89 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 8(d)(1), Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633, 664 (1976).
90 Unlike supply-oriented programs, the subsidy provided by the Section 8 Existing
Housing Certificate Program is not tied to a particular rental unit, but instead is tied to
an individual recipient who can use it to pay for any housing that meets federal
requirements.
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federally prescribed maximum level, 91 households participating in
the Section 8 Existing Housing Certificate Program must pay no
more than thirty percent of their income for rent. The difference
between thirty percent of income and the dwelling's rent is paid for
by the federal government. 92
In this section, I compare alternative methods for subsidizing
low income housing. I conclude that the predictions of privatization
proponents are consistent with existing empirical evidence: in most
circumstances, demand-oriented subsidies are more efficient and ef-
fective than public housing in providing assistance to low income
households. I also examine how the structure and operation of the
public housing program contribute to its relative inefficiency and
again present evidence to support some, but not all, of the predic-
tions made by privatization theorists. Although the analysis in this
section supports increased reliance on the private sector to deliver
housing assistance to low income households, I describe certain cir-
cumstances in which public housing may better achieve public
objectives.
a. Comparing The Cost of Public Housing to Demand-Oriented
Subsidies
Most studies that compare the costs of alternative housing pro-
grams conclude that public housing is the most expensive method
to assist low income households. For example, a 1982 study con-
cluded that public housing and Section 8 New Construction housing
respectively cost fifty-five percent and twenty-seven percent more
than unsubsidized multifamily housing. 93 In 1988, the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated that housing an elderly household in
public housing for twenty years costs the government thirty percent
more than if it had given the household Section 8 Existing Housing
91 The fair market rent ceiling is the forty-fifth percentile of rents charged for ex-
isting residences in a given local market area. See JOHN C. WEICHER, THE
VOUCHER/PRODUCTION DEBATE 4 (M.I.T. Housing Policy Project, HP # 13, April 1988).
92 The Section 8 Freestanding Voucher Program is similar to the Existing Housing
Certificate Program, except that participating households may rent homes that cost
more than the federally prescribed maximum provided that they pay the excess rent out
of their own funds. If the rent actually paid by a voucher recipient is less than the feder-
ally prescribed maximum, the subsidy is nonetheless based on the higher amount, per-
mitting the tenant to pay less than 30% of his or her income for rent. For a comparison
of Section 8 certificates and vouchers, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL Hous-
ING: HOUSING VOUCHERS COST MORE THAN CERTIFICATES BUT OFFER ADDED BENEFITS
(1989). Section 8 vouchers and certificates provide assistance for terms ranging from 5
to 15 years. As of September 30, 1987, 874,000 households were assisted by the Ex-
isting Housing Certificate Program and 82,000 by the Freestanding Voucher. See CON-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 33, at 32-35.
93 See URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, INC., I THE COSTS OF HUD MUL-
TIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS S-22 (1982).
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Certificates and eight percent more than if it had provided the
household with a home in a Section 8 New Construction dwelling.9 4
Finally, a 1979 comparison of alternative housing subsidies found
that the annual cost of subsidizing a household under the public
housing program ranged from fifty percent to 112% more than the
cost of providing assistance through housing allowances.9 5
Comparing the costs of alternative housing subsidies supports
the prediction of advocates of privatization that public provision of
services is more costly than private provision. Unfortunately, little
systematic research has been done to examine why public housing
tends to be more expensive to construct and operate than privately
owned housing. It is therefore impossible to state with assurance
whether the relatively high cost of public housing is attributable to
public sector inefficiency or whether the expense is generated by
other forces. 96
94 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 33, at 50. The analysis assumes
that the household will be housed for a period of twenty years and that the units have a
useful life of twenty years without requiring rehabilitation. It is likely that the assump-
tion that public housing has no residual value overestimates the relative cost of public
housing. See infra note 95. The analysis also assumes a long-term discount rate of 27o.
95 See STEPHEN K. MAYO, SHIRLEY MANSFIELD, DAVID WARNER & RICHARD Z WETCH-
KENBAUM, HOUSING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER RENTAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS-
A COMPARISON BASED ON THE HOUSING ALLOWANCE DEMAND EXPERIMENT, PART 2:
COSTS AND EFFICIENCY 46-48 (1980). These estimates are based on the cost of subsi-
dizing an average, two-bedroom unit in each program. No consideration of variations in
quality are taken into account. In addition, the analysis assumes that the value of public
housing fully depreciates over forty years. The authors defend this assumption on the
ground that most public housing depreciates rather rapidly and requires further mod-
ernization expenditures. In addition, they estimate that even if their assumption of zero
residual value were wrong, such a mistake would overestimate the cost of public housing
by only 17%. See id. at 27-30. But see RACHEL G. BRATr, REBUILDING A Low-INCOME
HOUSING POLICY 72-75 (1989) (criticizing comparisons of supply- and demand-oriented
housing programs). For a description of housing allowances, see infra note 122.
96 The high cost of public housing may be attributable to factors other than ineffi-
cient program design or operation. It is likely that public housing tenants earn lower
incomes than households who are assisted by housing allowances or the Section 8 Ex-
isting Housing Certificate Program. Therefore, since rent is based on income, the
amount paid by public housing tenants would likely be lower than the amount paid by
tenants assisted by demand-oriented subsidies, thereby increasing the size of the federal
subsidy. In addition, due in part to their lower incomes, public housing tenants may
have a disproportionate share of social or behavioral problems which might make opera-
tion of public housing more costly. See infra note 99; cf. CITIZENS HOUSING & PLANNING
ASSOCIATION, TENANCY AND COSTS IN PUBLIC HOUSING-POLICIES, ATITUDES AND CASE
STUDIES 149 (1986) (multiple regression analysis shows tht proportion of tenants who
are single parents on welfare is significantly related to increased operatingn expenses).
Furthermore, unlike private entrepreneurs, public housing managers may view their role
not solely as housing providers, but as providers of social services. Direct provision of
social services, such as job counseling and recreation, increase the cost of public housing
as compared to privately owned housing. See infra text accompanying note 133. In addi-
tion, public housing managers, in their role as social service providers, may be less likely
immediately to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent, instead preferring to try to work
out a plan of affordable payments. But cf. RICHARD LEMPERT, DISCRETION IN A BEHAV-
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Nevertheless, certain evidence suggests that the seeming ineffi-
ciency of public housing may, at least in part, be explained by the
theories propounded by advocates of privatization. As summarized
in Part I, supporters of privatization argue that government will in-
evitably provide services less efficiently than the private sector be-
cause the absence of transferable private property rights in
government enterprise reduces the incentives of individuals to mon-
itor government programs and insist on cost minimization. Priva-
tization is also justified on the ground that the structure of the
political process tends to promote rent-seeking behavior on the part
of special interest groups and bureaucrats, leading to the maximiza-
tion of private, rather than public benefit.
Several studies have noted that the absence of market discipline
may contribute to the increased cost of public housing. According
to one analysis, a major reason for the high cost of public housing is
inflated construction expenditures. The study concludes that the
market value of the housing services provided by public housing
would not justify a similar investment by the private sector.97 To the
contrary, the government would save money, according to the
study, by purchasing housing from the existing stock rather than
building it itself.98 The authors also note that operating costs of
public housing tend to be approximately thirty percent higher than
the cost of operating similar housing in the private sector.99 Several
IORAL PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF A PUBLIC HOUSING EVICTION BOARD 12 (Univ. of
Mich., September 1989) (describing how discretion of public housing managers to
"work with" tenants in financial difficulty has been limited due to more efficient record
keeping). Although this type of behavior might not be profit-maximizing or cost-mini-
mizing, it may be well within the mission of the public housing program and therefore
not inefficient.
97 See S. MAYO, S. MANSFIELD, D. WARNER & R. ZVVETCHKENBAUM, supra note 95, at
151. The authors reach this conclusion by capitalizing the rents that public housing
would earn in the private market. They find that the capitalized rental value of public
housing is less than its development cost. Therefore, they conclude that the housing's
hypothesized market value would not justify its construction. See id.
98 See id. at 154. Part of the differential between the cost of constructing public and
privately owned housing may be attributable to the nature of the subsidy rather than the
absence of private property rights. Under the public housing program, the capital costs
of construction are, within limits, fully paid for by the federal government, whereas op-
erating expenses are only partially subsidized. This asymmetrical subsidy provides an
incentive for PHAs to over-invest in capital (i.e., construction expenditures) to avoid
higher maintenance costs in the future, costs for which they will be at least partially
responsible. See RICHARD F. MUTH, PUBLIC HOUSING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION 17-18
(1973).
99 See S. MAYO, S. MANSFIELD, D. WARNER & R. ZWETCHKENBAUM, supra note 95, at
170; see also ARTHUR P. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 153-54 (1974) (inefficient
operating procedures contribute to low public housing cost effectiveness). But cf GRAN-
VILLE CORP., PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATE MANAGEMENT: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY xi (1983) (PHA operational expenses for urban family projects
were not significantly different from expenses at comparable projects managed by pri-
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examinations of individual public housing authorities reinforce
these findings by cataloging instances of lax accounting procedures
and insufficient inventory controls.' 00
A large proportion of the differential between the cost of public
housing and private sector housing may be attributable to the polit-
ical process. The public housing program is the product of legisla-
tion that bears the mark of special interest groups. The preamble of
the Housing Act of 1937 makes clear that the program was con-
ceived as a public employment and slum clearance program as much
vate contractors). Inefficient management may not explain the entire differential in op-
erating expenses between public housing and housing available through the private
market. Private landlords have extremely broad discretion with respect to their choice
of tenants. In many circumstances, they may refuse to house tenants who they suspect
are likely to constitute problems either due to household composition, criminal records
or histories of nonpayment of rent. A public housing authority's tenant selection pro-
cess is circumscribed by statutory and administrative regulations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437a(b)(3) (1982) (establishing admission preferences for elderly, handicapped and
displaced persons); 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204-960.207 (1988) (tenant selection regulations).
In addition, prospective tenants are entitled to a certain degree of due process with
respect to selection and termination. See Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425
F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (public housing tenants entitled to due process with respect to
termination of tenancies); Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d
Cir. 1968) (due process requires selection of public housing tenants be made according
to ascertainable standards). For an excellent in-depth examination of the eviction pro-
cedure of the Hawaii Housing Authority, see R. LEMPERT, supra note 96; RICHARD
LEMPERT, THE DYNAMICS OF INFORMAL PROCEDURE: THE CASE OF A PUBLIC HOUSING
EVICTION BOARD (Univ. of Mich., April 1989); RICHARD LEMPERT & KARL MONSMA, LAW-
YERS AND INFORMALJUSTICE: THE CASE OF A PUBLIC HOUSING EVICTION BOARD (Univ. of
Mich., March 1989). Because of this reduced discretion and, in some circumstances, a
moral obligation to be the landlord of last resort, public housing may house a dispropor-
tionate portion of tenants who have a wide variety of financial and behavioral problems.
The cost of operating housing for these households may therefore be expected to ex-
ceed the cost of providing housing in the private sector.
100 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: CHICAGO
HOUSING AUTHORITY TAKING STEPS TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS 24-36 (1989)
(examining management problems of Chicago Housing Authority including its failure to
establish and implement an adequate system of internal controls, budget overruns and
frequent turnover of top management); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUBLIC HOUSING: CONDITIONS AT THE LAUREL PARK PROJECT IN ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA
10 (1987) (discussing inadequate and ineffective maintenance program of PHA); URBAN
SYSTEMS RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, INC., supra note 93, at S-23 (reason for higher cost
of public housing partially attributable to large number of uncontrolled budget catego-
ries).
The problem of inefficient operating practices by PHAs should not be overempha-
sized. HUD periodically conducts management reviews of PHAs throughout the nation.
An examination of the most recent management reviews for 37 PHAs under the jurisdic-
tion of HUD's Philadelphia Area Office reveals that most PHAs were deemed to operate
in compliance with HUD regulations and practices. The following are the problems
most frequently cited by the HUD auditors, followed by the number of PHAs cited for
having these problems: excessive tenant accounts receivable (8); excessive vacancies
and slow turnover of apartments (7); insufficient inventory controls (7); insufficient pro-
curement practices (6); lack of salary comparability data on file (5); insufficient mainte-
nance (4); failure to submit reports to HUD in a timely fashion (3); cost overruns (3).
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as a program to provide housing to low income households in a
cost-effective manner. 0 1 In fact, the public employment and slum
clearance objectives of the program conflict with efficient produc-
tion of housing. As public employment legislation, supported by or-
ganized labor, 0 2 the Housing Act provides that employees and
contractors of PHAs must be paid wages not less than those prevail-
ing for similar work in the locality.10 3 The prevailing wage floor, as
well as other concessions to organized labor, 0 4 substantially in-
crease the costs associated with the construction of public
housing. 05
The link between public housing and slum clearance also has
had the effect of greatly increasing the costs of public housing.
Slum clearance was included in the Housing Act of 1937 largely to
placate adversaries of public housing who were concerned about
competition from newly constructed publicly owned dwellings. 10 6
101 "An Act to provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivisions
thereof for the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions, for the eradica-
tion of slums, for the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low
income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of business activ-
ity." Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
102 Among the most vocal supporters of the Housing Act of 1937 were the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). See LE-
ONARD FREEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 76 (1969); NATHANIEL S.
KEITH, POLITICS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS SINCE 1930 36 (1973); TIMOTHY L. McDON-
NELL, THE WAGNER HOUSING ACT: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 307-08
(1957); Gertrude S. Fish, Housing Policy During The Great Depression, in THE STORY OF
HOUSING 177, 216 (Gertrude Fish ed. 1979).
103 Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 16(2), 50 Stat. 888, 896-97 (1937) (currently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1440(g) (1982)). Prevailing wages are those determined by the Secretary of
Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act. See 40 U.S.C.A. § 276a (West 1986).
104 Statutes and regulations also required all federal projects to be governed by fed-
eral wage laws and all officers and employees of the federal housing agency to be cov-
ered by compensation insurance. See CHARLES ABRAMS, THE FUTURE OF HOUSING 273
(1946).
105 Numerous studies document the effect of the Davis Bacon Act in raising the cost
of federally sponsored construction projects. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
MODIFYING THE DAVIS-BACON ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LABOR MARKET AND THE FED-
ERAL BUDGET 26 (1983) (Davis-Bacon Act is estimated to increase wages from 2% to
11 %); ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION: THE DAVIS-BACON
ACT, STATE "LrrrLE DAVIS-BACON" ACTS, THE WALSH-HEALEY ACT, AND THE SERVICE
CONTRACT ACT 129 (1986) (Davis-Bacon is "an expensive piece of legislation adding
perhaps $1 billion a year to the cost of federal building projects."); UNITED STATES GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE DAVIS-BACON ACT SHOULD BE REPEALED 10-11 (1979)
(when compared to wages paid by the private sector, Davis-Bacon Act wages averaged
36.8% higher). Among the reasons for the increase in wages attributable to the Davis-
Bacon Act are the fact that the floor is presumably set at the median wage, thereby
prohibiting the government from taking advantage of the lower wages of one-half of the
area's labor force and the tendency of the government to inflate the prevailing wage
estimates. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra, at 24; UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra, at 10; Steven G. Gallen, Much Ado About Davis-Bacon: A Criti-
cal Review and New Evidence, 26 J. L. & ECON. 707, 709, 734 (1983).
106 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 111-12 (1968)
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Under the Housing Act's "equivalent elimination" provisions, 0 7 for
every unit of public housing built, an equivalent unit of low income
housing must have been demolished, thereby leaving the overall
supply of low income housing unchanged. Supported by real estate
and local business interests,108 slum clearance became the central
element of the Housing Acts of 1949109 and 1954.110 Under the
urban redevelopment and urban renewal programs, local govern-
ment agencies purchased and cleared "blighted" land and then sold
it to private entrepreneurs at prices that were approximately thirty
percent of the cost to the local government. Between two-thirds
and three-quarters of this seventy percent "write down" was paid
for by the federal government.1 I Since the program envisioned the
demolition of significant amounts of housing, Congress required
that households displaced by redevelopment be given priority in the
newly constructed public housing authorized by the 1949 Act. 1 2
Linking slum clearance to housing had several deleterious ef-
(equivalent elimination requirement guaranteed that there would not be a substantial
increase in housing stock); D.JUDD, supra note 35, at 262 (purpose of equivalent elimina-
tion was to keep public housing from competing with private sector housing); Peter Mar-
cuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, 8 Soc. PoL'Y 21, 24 (1978)
(expansion of housing supply was not the goal of the Housing Act of 1937).
107 Pub. L. No. 75-412 § 10(a), 50 Stat. 888, 891 (1937) (omitted from Housing Act
in recodification, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633, 653 (1976)).
108 ROGER FRIEDLAND, POWER AND CRISIS IN THE CITY: CORPORATIONS, UNIONS AND
URBAN POLICY 79 (1983) (urban redevelopment favored by "largest downtown corpora-
tions and financial intermediaries ... who were interested in the economic reconstruc-
tion of the central city, and the prevention of another depression .. "); D. JUDD, supra
note 35, at 264-65 (discussing support of National Association of Real Estate Boards for
urban redevelopment so long as it was implemented by private sector); Marcuse, supra
note 106, at 25 (real estate interests supported urban redevelopment in principle); Marc
Weiss, The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES AND PRO-
GRAMS 253, 254 (J. Paul Mitchell ed. 1985) ("Urban renewal owes its origins to the
downtown merchants, banks, large corporations, newspaper publishers, realtors, and
other institutions with substantial business and property interests in the central part of
the city."). Despite supporting slum clearance, some of these same interests lobbied
vociferously against the public housing provisions of the Housing Acts of 1937 and
1949. See N. KErrH, supra note 102, at 103 (support by real estate lobby for slum clear-
ance tempered opposition to Housing Act of 1949); Jewel Bellush & Murray
Hausknecht, Urban Renewak An Historical Overview in URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLrrICs
AND PLANNING 3, 11 (Jewel Bellush & Murray Hausknecht eds. 1967) ("The bill [Housing
Act of 1949], sponsored by the unlikely trio of Senators Robert Taft, Allen Ellender, and
Robert F. Wagner, Sr., also contained an urban redevelopment program supported by
many of the same groups opposed to its public housing provisions. It seems likely that
without the latter the bill would have passed with little or no difficulty, and that the
redevelopment sections helped overcome opposition to the public housing titles.");
Ashley A. Foard & Hilbert Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 71, 81-92 (James Q. Witson ed. 1966) (real
estate interests supported urban redevelopment, but did not support public housing).
109 Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, §§ 101-10, 63 Stat. 413, 414 (1950).
110 Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, §§ 301-16, 68 Stat. 590, 622 (1955).
111 See M. ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 21-22.
112 Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 302, 63 Stat. 413, 423 (1950).
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fects on public housing which might account for at least a portion of
its seemingly inflated cost. The requirement that a unit of slum
housing be demolished for each unit of public housing built, at least
for a time, effectively limited most public housing to central cities,
since suburban jurisdictions did not have large quantities of
blighted housing.' 13 In addition to assuring that public housing ten-
ants would have the lowest incomes and the fewest economic oppor-
tunities,11 4 locating public housing in large central cities resulted in
much higher land prices than would have been incurred had the
housing been constructed in suburbs. 115 To economize on land
costs, PHAs were forced to build higher structures than might
otherwise have been desirable; this, in turn, increased construction
and operating expenses,1 6 not to mention social costs." 17
113 Suburbs that did not want public housing had numerous other methods to shield
themselves from its construction. Because the program was voluntary and decentralized
to local government units, communities that did not want public housing could merely
decline to participate. Suburbs could also enact land use restrictions that made the de-
velopment of public housing impossible. In combination with the equivalent elimina-
tion provisions of the Housing Act of 1937, the structure of the public housing program
effectively limited most public housing to large central cities. See K. JACKSON, supra note
68, at 227 (1985). For an analysis of the reasons why certain communities elected to
participate in the public housing program and built large numbers of units, see Michael
Aiken & Robert R. Alford, Community Structure And Innovation: The Case of Public Housing,
64 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 843 (1970).
114 See sources cited supra note 35 (discussing urban underclass).
115 Land located at the center of cities is much more expensive than land at the
periphery. See MICHAEL GOLDBERG & PETER CHINLOY, URBAN LAND ECONOMICS 103-20
(1984) (discussing the bid rent model of land demand).
116 Tall buildings require expensive mechanical systems such as elevators that are
not needed for low density dwellings. Given the high usage of these systems and the
consequent need for repair, both construction and operating expenses would tend to be
higher for high rise as opposed to low-scale dwellings.
117 Greater population densities may lead to a wide variety of social costs such as
crime and vandalism, which inevitably increase operating expenses attributable to secur-
ity and repair. See R. JONES, D. KAMINSKY & M. ROANHOUSE, supra note 84, at 47
("[T]roubled projects have, on average, about twice as many units as relatively un-
troubled projects and nearly three times as many as untroubled projects .. "). See
generally OSCAR NEUMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DE-
SIGN (1973) (critique of public housing architecture and population concentration). The
requirement of the urban renewal program that displaced households be granted prior-
ity in admission also increased the level of social hardship among tenants. See Bratt,
supra note 74, at 339 (discussing racial and economic transition of public housing ten-
ants).
The poor physical quality and appearance of some public housing may also have
been attributable to the influence of private real estate interests. The real estate indus-
try was concerned that public housing might compete with housing available in the pri-
vate market. Partly in response to these pressures, Congress enacted requirements that
public housing not have "elaborate or expensive design or materials" and that it not
cost more than the average construction cost of dwellings produced by the private sector
See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 112-13. In making the housing legislation politically
acceptable, Congress may have planted the seeds for future deterioration, social
problems and rising operating and maintenance expenses. See RAYMOND J. STRUYK, A
NEW SYSTEM FOR PUBLIC HOUSING: SALVAGING A NATIONAL RESOURCE 29-37 (1980) (cat-
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Although the absence of private property rights and the influ-
ence of special interest groups may account for a portion of the rela-
tively high cost of public housing, little evidence substantiates the
privatization advocates' prediction that part of the increased cost of
public housing is attributable to the tendency of bureaucrats to max-
imize their salaries or the size of their bureaus. Despite the occa-
sional scandal involving the corruption of PHA officials or
employees," a8 excessive salaries and staffs do not appear endemic.
An examination of recent management reviews for thirty-seven
PHAs under the jurisdiction of HUD's Philadelphia Area Office 1 9
indicates that only two were criticized for excessive salaries or fringe
benefits and only one was admonished for over-staffing.
b. Other Advantages and Limitations of Demand-Oriented
Subsidies
In addition to being more economical than public housing, de-
mand-oriented subsidies provide tenants with greater choice as to
the type of home and location. 120 Furthermore, to the extent that
subsidized households occupy the existing stock of housing, de-
mand-oriented subsidies may promote renovation of existing build-
ings or, at least, help prevent disinvestment.' 2 1
aloguing design flaws attributable, in part, to cost-cutting); Albert Mayer, Public Housing
Architecture Evaluated From PWA Days Up to 1962, 19J. HOUSING 446 (1962) (same); Albert
Mayer, Public Housing Design, 20 J. HOUSING 133 (1963) (same).
118 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: HUD OVER-
SIGHT OF THE ANNAPOLIS HOUSING AUTHORITY (1989) (examining HUD's oversight over
PHA during period when executive director misappropriated comprehensive improve-
ment funds); Jason DeParle, The Worst City Government in America, THE WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, January 1989, at 33, 41-42 (discussing corruption involving District of Co-
lumbia Department of Human Services executives); Mark Mooney, 5 Percent of Housing
Authority Supers on the Take, United Press Int'l, Sept. 19, 1985; Martin Tolchin, Kemp Tight-
ens Control of 3,300 Housing Agencies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1990, at A-23, col. 1 (Kemp acts
to increase HUD oversight over PHAs after reports that director of Passaic, NJ. PHA
was paid for two full-time and two part-time jobs).
119 See supra note 100.
120 Nevertheless, most demand subsidies enacted thus far require households to live
in units that meet minimum quality standards. Some housing analysts have questioned
whether tenants should be required to live in units which meet minimum quality stan-
dards as a condition of receiving federal assistance. See I. WELFELD, supra note 69, at
242-44 (criticizing minimum quality standards).
121 Nevertheless, empirical evidence indicates that demand-oriented subsidies typi-
cally do not lead to significant upgrading of the existing housing stock. See infra text
accompanying note 126. For a discussion of how housing deterioration may contribute
to neighborhood disinvestment and renovation to reinvestment, see A. DowNs, supra
note 45, at 61-71 (discussing stages of neighborhood change); MICHAEL H. SCHILL &
RICHARD P. NATHAN, REVITALIZING AMERICA'S CITIES: NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT
AND DISPLACEMENT 9-45 (1983) (discussing causes and extent of neighborhood revitali-
zation).
Even if demand-oriented subsidies do not necessarily lead to an upgrading of the
housing stock, they may be preferable to public housing on the ground that they do not
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Demand-oriented subsidies, however, are not the solution to all
of the problems historically addressed by housing policy. In 1974,
HUD funded the Experimental Housing Allowance Program
("EHAP"), an enormous demonstration project designed to ex-
amine the feasibility of a housing assistance payment entitlement
program.1 22 The study's results showed that only fifty-six percent of
eligible households had an interest in participating in the program,
and, of these households, only seventy-five percent successfully lo-
cated housing.' 23 Among the reasons for the rather low participa-
tion rates were the difficulties encountered by minority households
in locating housing due to discrimination 124 and the desire of many
people to remain in their existing homes although the housing's
substandard quality would disqualify them for assistance. 125 In
lead to disinvestment. Richard Muth has suggested that one negative aspect of public
housing is its effect on the existing housing stock. According to Muth, the construction
of public housing will increase the supply of housing and stimulate the filtering of units
as tenants vacate their current homes. Their vacated units would filter down to an even
lower income household and eventually be abandoned. Thus, public housing may not
increase the total supply of low income housing in the long run and may lead to disin-
vestment. See RICHARD F. MUTH, URBAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 116 (1975); see also E.
MILLS & B. HAMILTON, supra note 39, at 241 (possible that public housing increases rate
of retirement of housing). But cf Donald F. Vitaliano, Public Housing and Slums: Cure or
Cause?, 20 URB. STUD. 173, 179, 182 (1983) (econometric analysis of census data indi-
cates impact of public housing on housing disinvestment is minor and that rents in pri-
vately owned buildings decline an average of only 5 to 9% for each 1% increase in the
proportion of public housing units in the total stock). Demand-oriented subsidies, how-
ever, may permit landlords to maintain the existing housing stock in addition to stimu-
lating additional demand for new housing.
122 EHAP was authorized by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-609, § 504, 84 Stat. 1770, 1786 (1970), "[t]o demonstrate the feasibility of
providing families of low income with housing allowances to assist them in obtaining
rental housing of their choice in existing standard housing units." Id. EHAP had three
components: (1) The Housing Allowance Demand Experiment, (2) the Housing Allow-
ance Supply Experiment and (3) the Administrative Agency Experiment. The Demand
Experiment entailed the issuance of three-year housing allowances to a sample of house-
holds in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Phoenix, Arizona. The objective of the study was
to examine the effects of alternative benefit formulas on the housing consumption of
participating households. The Supply Experiment resulted in offers of housing al-
lowances to all low income households in two housing markets, Green Bay, Wisconsin
and South Bend, Indiana. The amount of the cash housing allowance in the Supply
Experiment was based on income and the cost of housing in each market, but not on the
actual expenditures of the participants. Only households living in dwellings that met
minimum standards with respect to space, facilities, safety and sanitation were entitled
to participate in the experiment. See EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES: THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE HOUSING ASSISTANCE SUPPLY EXPERIMENT 1-83 (Ira S. Lowry ed.
1983) (describing EHAP) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES].
123 See.J. WEICHER, supra note 91, at 14.
124 This is consistent with experience from the Section 8 Existing Housing Certifi-
cate Program. Under that program, about half of the white certificate holders success-
fully located housing, compared to only one quarter of minority households. See id. at
16.
125 See EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES, supra note 122, at 85-86 (hous-
ing standards discouraged some eligible people from participating in Supply Experi-
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addition, housing allowances, for the most part, did not succeed in
improving the quality of housing or in increasing housing consump-
tion. Under EHAP, tenants were entitled to spend more than the
allowance for housing if they wished, or, alternatively, to spend less
and keep the difference. Tenants, whose existing housing met mini-
mum standards, tended to remain where they were, substituting the
allowance for their personal funds. 126
Despite these limitations, EHAP demonstrates that the private
sector can successfully accommodate increased demand. In perhaps
the most important result of the experiment, the researchers found
that housing allowances did not cause inflation in the price of the
existing housing stock.' 2 7 Although the absence of increased rental
prices might reflect the choice of locations for the experiment or the
fact that less than half of all eligible households participated, it did
suggest that, under varying market conditions, demand-oriented
subsidies are an effective and efficient mechanism for delivering
housing services to low income households. This is especially true
when the primary objective of the subsidy is to make housing more
affordable.
Nevertheless, although economic theory and empirical evidence
support increased reliance on housing vouchers or rent certificates,
they also support a continuing role for public housing. As EHAP
ment). Lowry also cites small allowance entitlements, brief durations of eligibility, lack
of information and reluctance to receive governmental assistance as reasons for the low
level of participation. See id.
126 See id. at 24 (half of all enrollees joined program while living in dwellings that
met minimum standards and mainly used allowance to defray rent); C. PETER RYDELL,
KEVIN NEELS, & C. LANCE BARNET, PRICE EFFECTS OF HOUSING ALLOWANCE 22 (Rand
Paper Series P-6794, 1982) (only small proportion of housing allowance goes into in-
creased consumption). But see BernardJ. Frieden, Housing Allowances: An Experiment That
Worked, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 373 (J. Paul Mitchell ed. 1985)
(large numbers of households moved or upgraded their homes). Because many eligible
households either remained in their existing dwellings or declined to participate, EHAP
indicated that a housing allowance program would likely have little impact on improving
the geographic mobility of low income households. See Kevin F. McCarthy, Housing
Search and Residential Mobility, in THE GREAT HOUSING EXPERIMENT 191 (Joseph Friedman
& Daniel H. Weinberg eds. 1983) (EHAP "had little effect on either the rate at which
recipients moved or the geographic pattern of their mobility"); Peter H. Rossi, Residen-
tial Mobility, in Do HOUSING ALLOWANCES WORK? 147, 167 (Katherine Bradbury &
Anthony Downs eds. 1981) (increase in probability of moving attributable to EHAP Sup-
ply Experiment is between 5.2% and 9.6%).
127 EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES, supra note 122, at 26 (EHAP Supply
Experiment "[h]ad no perceptible effect on rents or property values.,. . ."); C. RYDELL,
K. NEELS & C. BARNETT, supra note 126, at 20 ("housing allowance program had virtually
no effect on the price of housing.. ."); Frieden, supra note 126, at 376 (same). Evalu-
ators of EHAP attribute the absence of price effects to the repair of some housing units,
new construction and an increase in occupancy rates. See EXPERIMENTING wrrH HOUSING
ALLOWANCES, supra note 122, at 177; C. PETER RYDELL & C. LANCE BARNETT, PRICE EF-
FECTS OF HOUSING ALLOWANCES 20 (1982).
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and the Section 8 Program demonstrate, demand-oriented subsidies
are unlikely to improve markedly the quality of housing. Although
the problem of deteriorated housing is less severe today than in the
past, 128 among particular socioeconomic and racial groups substan-
dard housing remains a major problem.' 29 In addition to improving
housing quality for its residents, the replacement of deteriorated
private housing with new public housing may eliminate the external-
ities associated with substandard housing in certain neighbor-
hoods. 130 Public housing may also be necessary in certain
jurisdictions where the private sector cannot supply sufficient hous-
ing to satisfy demand due to market constraints such as stringent
land use regulation, building codes or rent control.' 3 ' In addition,
128 See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
129 See PAUL A. LEONARD, CUSHING N. DOLBEARE & EDWARD B. LAZERE, A PLACE To
CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR 55 (1989) (black and Hispanic
households are twice as likely as white households to live in substandard dwellings).
130 See William A. Rabiega, Ta-Win Lin & Linda M. Robinson, The Property Value Im-
pacts of Public Housing Projects in Low and Moderate Density Residential Neighborhoods, 60 LAND
ECON. 174, 178 (1984) (properties in Portland, Oregon gained value after location of
public housing in close proximity). But see Hugh 0. Nourse, A Rationale for Government
Intervention in Housing: The External Benefit of Good Housing, Particularly with Respect to Neigh-
borhood Property Values, in I HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES: WORKING PAPERS 243, 250 (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1976) ("There is no evidence sup-
porting subsidization of the poor in standard quality housing in order to improve sur-
rounding property values."). The objective of improving housing quality for low
income households or neighborhoods does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
public housing is the appropriate form of government intervention. Some would say
that public housing, itself, creates neighborhood effects by blighting neighborhoods.
Although, as I have demonstrated, the stereotypical image of public housing is at war
with reality, see supra text accompanying notes 79-86, an alternative policy approach
would be to subsidize construction of low income housing by the private sector. Empiri-
cal studies, however, have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether supply-oriented
subsidies paid to private sector developers are more cost-effective than public housing.
Compare CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 33, at 92 (public housing is less
expensive than Section 8 New Construction) with URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND ENGI-
NEERING, INC., supra note 93, at S-4 to S-5 (public housing is more expensive than Sec-
tion 8 New Construction). The construction of public housing may also facilitate
community redevelopment by providing homes for displaced households. Whereas reli-
ance on the private market would likely lead to hardship due to the time between clear-
ance and construction of new housing, the government could coordinate the
construction of public housing to precede clearance.
131 Given the structure of the public housing program, however, it may be difficult
for the program to correct these market barriers. Decisions on building and locating
public housing are made by PHAs, which frequently are composed of people appointed
by locally elected public officials. Theirjurisdiction is usually co-terminous with the mu-
nicipality in which they are located. Therefore, it is unlikely that a PHA would be in-
clined to obtain an exemption from restrictive zoning and building code requirements.
Furthermore, PHAs in urban locations which would like to build housing in suburban
locations will in most cases be unable to do so, since they do not have the power to build
outside their municipal boundaries. But see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (sub-
sidized housing is ordered to be located outside city despite absence of interdistrict vio-
lation); CAROL B. MEEKS, HOUSING 253 (1980) (some PHAs serve several municipalities
or counties).
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to the extent that housing markets are extremely tight and the sup-
ply of housing, at least in the short-run, relatively inelastic, publicly
provided housing may be helpful in preventing price inflation. 132
Public housing may also be used as a convenient vehicle for the pub-
lic sector to provide social services such as health care, job training
and education. 133
Public housing can also be utilized efficiently and effectively to
promote racial integration. Frequently, PHAs have been justifiably
condemned for creating and maintaining housing segregation. 134
Nevertheless, many PHAs have constructed successful scattered-site
housing in non-racially impacted communities. 135 Most housing
analysts agree that minority households face discrimination in the
132 For a description of the problems faced by households seeking to utilize housing
vouchers in extremely tight housing markets, see Michael Winerip, In New York, H. U.D. 's
Vouchers Pay for Already Cheap Housing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (vouchers
given to already subsidized tenants because vouchers were insufficient to enable low
income households to rent apartments in unsubsidized private market). The ability of
public housing to ameliorate problems of short-term supply inelasticity would depend
on the public sector being able to purchase land, obtain government approvals and con-
struct housing in a more expeditious manner than the private sector. Certain factors
facilitate quick PHA action, such as its power of eminent domain and the likelihood that
PHA officials would have a political relationship with municipal officials in charge of
dispensing building permits and zoning variances. Cf. E. MEEHAN, supra note 53, at 25
(high probability of a significant amount of interaction between elected officials and
PHA). Nevertheless, the fact that the decision to locate and build public housing is a
public one may lead to procedural delays and time-consuming controversy. See, e.g.,
MARTIN MEYERSON & EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST 91-120 (1955) (describing community opposition to public housing).
133 See COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES, supra note 63, at 25-27
(describing innovative services provided by PHAs); Matulef, supra note 78, at 176
(same).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aft'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); WILLIAM C.
JOHNSON, THE POLITCS OF URBAN PLANNING 138 (1989) (public housing located in mi-
nority neighborhoods or other areas undesirable to whites); John M. Goering & Modibo
Coulibably, Investigating Public Housing Segregation: Conceptual and Methodological Issues, 25
URB. AFF. Q. 265, 281 (1989) (in 1977, the percentage of units in which blacks consti-
tuted over 80% of the project's population was 46%); Elizabeth K. Julian & Michael M.
Daniels, Separate And Unequal-The Root and Branch of Public Housing Segregation, 23
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 666 (1989) (discussing litigation strategies to challenge public
housing race segregation). But cf. Wilhemina A. Leigh & Mildred 0. Mitchell, Public
Housing and the Black Community, 17 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 107, 118-19 (1988) (segrega-
tion in inner city public housing projects is inevitable because of racial composition of
waiting lists).
135 SeeJames B. Hogan & Dorothy L. Lengyel, Experiences With Scattered-Site Housing,
2 URB. RESOURCES 9, 11-12 (1985) (survey of residents in Seattle's scattered-site public
housing showed very high levels of satisfaction with neighborhoods and housing and an
increased feeling of self-worth); J. Dennis Lord & George S. Rent, Residential Satisfaction
in Scattered-Site Public Housing Projects, 24 Soc. ScI. J. 287, 300 (1987) (survey of predomi-
nantly black residents in scattered-site housing developments in white areas of Char-
lotte, North Carolina indicates that they were overwhelmingly satisfied with their
residences); Ruth G. Price, A Cheer for the Agencies, PLANNING, Feb. 1985, at 19-20 (dis-
cussing scattered-site projects throughout the country); William K. Stevens, Scattered
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housing market that frequently prevents them from locating hous-
ing in white neighborhoods or, alternatively, results in their paying
a premium for housing in such areas.13 6 The cost of building public
housing in white neighborhoods may, in some instances, be less ex-
pensive than subsidizing the discrimination-inflated rents of minor-
ity tenants in the private sector.'3 7
In summary, subsidizing consumer demand through housing al-
lowances or vouchers seems to be the policy best suited to providing
the greatest number of low income households with decent and af-
fordable homes.' 38 Nevertheless, it would be naive to expect a de-
mand-oriented approach to be appropriate in all contexts. Housing
markets are local, rather than national, thereby creating the need for
a wide variety of approaches to deal with distinctive problems. In
many markets, housing allowances alone will be sufficient. On the
other hand, direct provision of housing by the public sector may
Low-Cost Housing Offers Renewed Hope To Poor and Minorities, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1988, at
6, col. 1 (same).
136 See John Yinger, The Racial Dimension of Urban Housing Markets in the 1980s, in
DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PAT'ERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 43, 59 (Gary A.
Tobin, ed. 1987) [hereinafter DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS] ("The best studies all find that
the price of equivalent housing is higher in largely black than in largely white neighbor-
hoods and that within a given neighborhood blacks pay more than whites for equivalent
housing."); John Yinger, Prjudice and Discrimination in the Urban Housing Market, in CUR-
RENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONoMIcs 430, 455-57 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim
eds. 1979) (summarizing studies about price differentials based on race); cf Douglas S.
Massey, Gretchen A. Condran & Nancy A. Denton, The Effect of Residential Segregation on
Black and Economic Well-Being, 66 Soc. FORCES 29, 52-54 (1987) (blacks are less able to
achieve spatial objectives than whites of similar social status). But see James R. Follain,
Jr. & Stephen Malpezzi, Another Look at Racial Differences in Housing Prices, 18 URB. STUD.
195, 201 (1981) (regression results "indicate decline and elimination of black
premiums.").
137 Cf James W. Fossett & Gary Orfield, Market Failure and Federal Policy: Low-Income
Housing in Chicago 1970-1983, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 136, at 158, 178
(1987) (housing allowances and demand subsidies will have limited effect unless access
to housing can be ensured). Public provision might also reduce high search costs in-
curred by minority households due to widespread racial steering practices. See Pearce, A
Sheltered Crisis: The State of Fair Housing Opportunity in the Eighties, in A SHELTERED CRISIS:
THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 143, 148 (U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, 1983) (discussing racial steering practices).
138 Housing assistance would seem to be an appropriate candidate for privatization
under the guidelines suggested in a recent book byJohn Donahue. See generallyJ. DONA-
HUE, supra note 13. Donahue suggests that privatization of services might achieve effi-
ciency gains in circumstances where the government can specify what it wants from the
private providers and monitor their performance effectively. See id. at 217. In addition,
efficiency gains are much more likely to occur when the private provider of services
operates in a competitive market. See id. at 218. To the extent that we as a society
determine that an objective of housing policy is improved housing quality, the govern-
ment can develop minimum standards and conduct periodic inspections, much as it does
under the Section 8 Existing Housing Certificate Program. Compliance by private land-
lords with program requirements should be readily ascertainable. Furthermore, as
noted at supra text accompanying note 41, housing markets typically meet the standards
of competitive markets.
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nonetheless be appropriate either as the primary housing delivery
mechanism or in conjunction with demand-oriented subsidies to
correct a wide variety of market failures and constraints or, alterna-
tively, to achieve other public objectives such as minimum quality
standards and effective delivery of social services.
III
PRIVATIZING PUBLIC HOUSING: UNFAIR AND UNWISE
It does not automatically follow from the conclusion that fed-
eral housing assistance should increasingly rely on the private sector
by subsidizing demand, rather than new construction, that the ex-
isting supply of public housing should be disposed of. To the con-
trary, in this section, after summarizing various proposals to
privatize the existing stock of public housing, I argue that a federal
requirement that PHAs sell their public housing to tenants at deeply
discounted prices would be inequitable and unwise. First, I demon-
strate that the underlying normative vision of proponents of propos-
als to sell public housing-that low income households should be
homeowners rather than tenants-is based upon rather tenuous em-
pirical assumptions and arguments. Second, even if transforming
tenants into homeowners were a desirable objective, selling public
housing to existing tenants is an inappropriate vehicle in which to
implement the policy. Privatizing public housing would grant wind-
falls to some purchasers and likely harm many others. Prospective
tenants, residents who do not purchase and PHAs would be ad-
versely affected by lengthened waiting lists, reduced selection of
units and locations, cutbacks in services and the further marginaliza-
tion of public sector housing. In reaching these conclusions, I draw
upon the experience of Great Britain since its enactment in 1980 of
a law giving tenants of publicly owned housing the right to purchase
their units. I analyze data collected by British researchers as well as
my own interviews with British policymakers and tenants. 139
A. Proposals To Privatize Public Housing
Proposals to sell public housing units to tenants are not entirely
new in the United States. In 1965, the federal government enacted
the Turnkey III Homeownership Opportunities Program which per-
mitted tenants to purchase newly built public housing when their
accumulated rent payments equalled the development cost of the
139 In addition to the books and articles cited in the text, evidence of the impact of
Great Britain's council housing privatization program was obtained from interviews with
over a dozen British government officials, neighborhood organizers, academics and ten-
ants conducted in 1985. In addition to interviewing these individuals, I visited several
council housing estates, including some that had been sold to tenants.
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unit or when they received sufficient mortgage financing. The pro-
gram, however, was not widely viewed as successful. Less than one-
fifth of the total number of units of housing authorized by Congress
were purchased, largely due to the long time period required for the
tenants' equity to build and the inability of low income households
to obtain private financing.' 40
More recent proposals to sell public housing to tenants are in-
spired by Great Britain's Housing Act of 1980.14t Before 1980, local
authorities in Great Britain could sell units of publicly owned hous-
ing, called "council housing," to occupants if they decided that the
sale was in the best interests of their constituents. In 1980, as part
of its legislative program to privatize the public sector,142 the British
government enacted legislation which gave tenants of council hous-
ing the right to buy their homes from local authorities. The Hous-
ing Act of 1980 prevents local authorities from exercising any
discretion in refusing to sell units from their stock of housing. The
legislation mandates that homes be sold at discounts that range
from thirty-three to sixty percent of market value. In addition, pur-
chasers are guaranteed mortgage loans to finance the sales. 143
In 1984, the Heritage Foundation proposed that the United
States adopt a program of public housing sales similar to the one in
Great Britain. 144 In 1984, 1985 and again in 1986, members of Con-
gress introduced bills to enable households living in public housing
for a period of two years, who are deemed by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development capable of assuming the responsi-
bilities of homeownership, to purchase their units provided that the
purchase would not interfere with the rights of other families resid-
ing in the public housing or harm the efficient operation of the pro-
140 See E. MEEHAN, supra note 72, at 157-64 (units in homeownership program were
more abused than units in any other family development); Hilary Silver, Judith McDon-
ald & Ronald J. Ortiz, Selling Public Housing: The Methods And Motivations, 42 J. HOUSING
213, 219 (1985); Privatization of the Federal Government, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mon-
etary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Econ. Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1984) [hereinafter
Privatization Hearings] (statement ofJune Koch, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dept. of HUD).
141 Housing Act, 1980, ch. 1, as amended by Housing Act, 1985, §§ 118-89.
142 For other aspects of Britain's privatization program, see generally PRIVATIZATION
AND THE WELFARE STATE (Julian Le Grand & Ray Robinson eds. 1984); C. VELJANOVSKY,
supra note 15; J. VICKERS & G. YARROW, supra note 17.
143 To reduce the likelihood that tenants would resell their homes for a profit
shortly after purchase, the Housing Act provides that if such a resale were to occur
within five years of the original purchase, the tenant-purchaser would have to repay a
portion of the purchase price discount to the local authority. The proportion of the
discount to be repaid upon resale decreases with time from the date of original
purchase. See Housing Act § 155 (1985).
144 The proposal suggests selling units at 30% of their assessed market value with
no downpayment required. PHAs would be expected to provide thirty-year mortgage
loans and purchasers would be penalized if they sold their units within seven years. See
S. BUTLER, M. SANERA & W. WEINROD, supra note 9, at 116-17.
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ject.145 Under the terms of the proposed legislation, PHAs would be
required to sell homes to qualifying tenants for a price not to exceed
twenty-five percent of the dwelling's fair market value. In addition,
the PHA would be required to provide mortgages to purchasers at
an interest rate not to exceed seventy percent of the market interest
rate. If a tenant were to resell his or her unit before five years had
elapsed, he or she would have to pay to the PHA a proportion of the
sales price ranging from seventy-five percent in the first year to fif-
teen percent in the fifth year. 146 Although this legislation did not
pass both houses of Congress, 147 a bill did pass establishing a volun-
tary homeownership program, 148 and HUD instituted a public hous-
ing sales demonstration project.149
In 1988, the President's Commission on Privatization recom-
mended the sale of public housing to tenants at discounted sales
prices. 150 In addition, the current Secretary of HUD, Jack Kemp, a
former congressional sponsor of legislation granting tenants the
145 See supra note 3.
146 The bills also provided for repair of the housing by the PHA before the sale, as
well as technical assistance and training for purchasers. See H.R. 4628, supra note 3, at
§ 2; S. 3030, supra note 3, at § 2; H.R. 6317, supra note 3, at § 2.
147 H.R. 4628, supra note 3, passed the House of Representatives in 1986. See supra
note 4. It was never taken up by the Senate.
148 Under the program, tenants of public housing may form a resident management
corporation. If the corporation operates effectively and efficiently for a period of three
years, the tenants may purchase one or more multifamily dwellings, provided that they
are prepared to undertake ownership, management and maintenance of the building,
and provided that the PHA certifies that the purchase will not interfere with the rights of
other families residing in public housing, will not harm efficient management of other
public housing and is in the community's interest. In addition, the PHA must, within
thirty months of the sale, replace all of the units sold. The tenant's price is determined
by negotiation between the purchaser and the PHA. Housing units may be resold only
to resident management corporations, lower income families or PHAs, and the amount
of profit that the seller can retain is strictly limited. No family residing in the public
housing project may be evicted as a result of the sale. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437s (Supp. V.
1987).
149 HUD announced the Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration on Octo-
ber 25, 1984. See 49 Fed. Reg. 43,028 (1984). Seventeen PHAs have been selected to
participate in the program. The PHAs have agreed to sell 1,315 units of public housing
to tenants. Under the program, the federal government will continue to make debt ser-
vice payments on the housing units sold. Furthermore, properties sold to tenants must
be in good condition prior to sale; tenants who do not wish to purchase their units may
not be displaced, and safeguards against windfall profits from resale must exist for a
minimum of five years after sale. The price for the units is to be negotiated between the
purchasers and the PHA. Id at 43,030-32. For a description of the demonstration pro-
ject and the structure of each PHA's sales program, see Department of City and Re-
gional Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Public Housing
Homeownership Demonstration Assessment: Background Program Description Report
(Jan. 1988).
150 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 17-18 ("For public
housing in good condition and consisting of detached one-family houses, duplexes and
row houses, Congress should pass legislation authorizing and directing HUD to sell
these units aggressively to tenants at a discounted price, with no further government
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right to buy public housing,151 has repeatedly stressed his commit-
ment to the sale of public housing units. 152
B. Evaluating Proposals To Sell Public Housing
Advocates of the sale of public housing to tenants suggest that
the policy would generate significant benefits. While a member of
Congress, Secretary Kemp asserted that poor people deserve to
share in the "American dream of homeownership."'' 53 Among the
advantages of homeownership usually mentioned are the ability of
tenants to share in the financial rewards of real estate investment, 154
the better care that owners would presumably take in maintaining
property they own,' 55 the security of knowing that they will not be
expenditures for upkeep or debt service, while providing vouchers to tenants that freely
elect to vacate.").
151 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
152 Kemp Stresses FederalAid To Poor Families, Not Developers, In Wide-Ranging Hearing, 16
HOUSING & DEv. REP. 1038 (May 1, 1989) (Kemp outlines six top agenda items: home-
lessness, economic development, homeownership, public housing tenant management
and homeownership, fair housing and anti-drug activities); Kemp, supra note 5 ("Last
month at my swearing-in ceremony at HUD, I was thrilled to hear Preisident [sic]
George Bush say that all public housing residents should have.., the right to purchase
their housing.... I am honored to help carry out that mandate, and I pledge the full
resources of this agency to make those rights and opportunities a reality for public hous-
ing residents of America.").
As part of its HOPE legislative program, see supra note 5, the Bush administration
has proposed a mandatory public housing sales program. Under the proposed legisla-
tion, PHAs or resident management corporations are invited to submit proposals to
HUD to convert public housing to private ownership. If the homeownership plan ap-
proved by HUD is intitiated by tenants, the PHA would be required to transfer the units.
HUD would provide financial assistance for the conversions in the form of planning and
implementation grants. Although once public housing units are converted to private
ownership they would no longer be eligible to receive public housing operating subsi-
dies, the the legislation contemplates that HUD would provide continuing financial
assistance either through grants or vouchers. The legislation places limits on how a
PHA could spend any proceeds it would receive from a sale. One-half of the money
could be used to defray costs incurred in operating the homeownership program; the
other half would have to be paid to HUD. If the initial sales price for the housing is
below market value, the plan submitted to HUD must include restrictions prohibiting
"undue profits" for a period often years. The legislation also provides that a homeown-
ership program may establish restrictions on resale. If the homeownership plan does
not restrict resales to lower income purchasers for "the life of the homeownership pro-
gram," replacement housing would have to be provided. Under the proposal, replace-
ment housing might include additional public housing units, Section 8 certificates or
vouchers, units provided through other HOPE programs, state or local housing or units
built by private developers taking advantage of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.
153 "They [poor people] too yearn for homeownership-a home they can afford, a
home in which to raise a family in security and independence, a home in which to take
pride while building and improving for the future for their children." Privatization Hear-
ings, supra note 140, at 27 (prepared statement of Rep. Jack Kemp).
154 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note I, at 16.
155 See Stuart Butler, Privatization: A Strategy For Taming The Federal Budget, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION REP.,Jan. 1, 1988, at 17. This justification for the sale of public housing is
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evicted or forced to move due to rising rents 156 and the increased
neighborhood stability fostered by better housing maintenance and
longer periods of residency. 157 Advocates of privatizing public
housing also point to the savings that will accrue to the federal gov-
ernment from no longer having to subsidize the public housing
stock that is sold. 158 Furthermore, floating through discussions of
privatization is the nebulous conviction that transforming poor peo-
ple into homeowners will make them feel more a part of the Ameri-
can capitalist system and perhaps alter their political perspective. 159
In this section, I examine the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed sale of public housing to low income tenants. On the
whole, evidence suggests that the case for transforming low income
tenants into homeowners is weaker than the adherents of privatiza-
tion suggest. By applying the experience of Great Britain's sale of
council housing to our own public housing program, I further con-
clude that the sale of public housing would be inequitable with re-
spect to low income households and potentially disastrous with
respect to the remaining public housing program.
1. Transforming Tenants into Homeowners
Homeownership is such an established feature of America's cul-
tural landscape that it almost seems subversive to question its mer-
its. Perhaps unsurprisingly, little systematic research exists that
evaluates the advantages of homeownership for low income house-
holds.160 Nevertheless, the benefits, although real in some in-
stances, have been characterized by one leading housing analyst as
"modest." 161 Based on an analysis of whether tenants receive as
great a level of housing services as similarly situated owner-occu-
a variant of the argument that freely alienable property rights will promote economic
efficiency. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
156 See Privatization Hearings, supra note 140 (statement by Kemp that homeownership
will result in security).
157 See 49 Fed. Reg. 43,028, 43,029 (1984) (notice of Public Housing Homeowner-
ship Demonstration).
158 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 16; Butler, supra
note 155.
159 See Privatization Hearings, supra note 140, at 27 (statement by Kemp that the major
goal is to "make the dream of homeownership a reality for thousands of public housing
tenants ... who don't have a strong voice in Washington, who feel left out of our eco-
nomic system, and who have often become alienated from our political system").
160 See PETER MARCUSE, HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR THE POOR: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE OWNER/OCCUPANT (Urban Institute Working Paper 112-26, Mar. 10, 1971);
RAYMOND J. STRX, SHOULD GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGE HOMEOWNERSHIP? (Urban Insti-
tute, 1977); Valerie Pierce, Federal Homeownership Programs For Low Income Fami-
lies: Lessons From Past Experience (Oct. 22, 1987) (unpublished student paper, Yale
Law School).
161 R. STmRuy, supra note 160, at 27.
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pants, Struyk concludes that basic housing services enjoyed by own-
ers are not "overwhelmingly universally greater" than those
supplied to renters by landlords. 162 The evidence does suggest,
however, that "[i]f a difference does exist, it is among lower-income
households."' 163 Struyk also finds it difficult to substantiate the pre-
diction that homeowners will contribute to neighborhood stability.
Owners do tend to move less frequently than renters. Since owners
are also investors, however, they may be more likely to flee neigh-
borhoods which exhibit early signs of distress or change.' 64
With respect to the financial rewards of homeownership, the
picture is even less clear. The benefits of homeownership are tied
to several factors: the national economy, the location of the home,
the nature of local housing markets and the ability of the purchaser
to afford the costs of maintenance, taxes and debt service. Recent
data on the sales prices of single family homes indicate that the dra-
matic appreciation of home values, which increased the wealth of
many moderate income American households over the past two de-
cades, has slowed or ceased. 165 Some economists have even sug-
gested that projected demographic forces, such as the coming of age
of the "baby bust" generation, may lead to a drop in demand for
housing and significant depreciation of home values over the next
several decades. 16 6
162 Id. at 19; cf Peter Linneman, An Economic Analysis of the Homeownership Decision, 17
J. URB. ECON. 230, 233 (1985) (landlord production costs may be lower than those of
owner-occupants because of their ability to solve free-rider problems and internalize
externalities. But see GEORGE C. GALSTER, HOMEOWNERS AND NEIGHBORHOOD REINVEST-
MENT 296 (1987) (survey of Wooster, Ohio households indicates that compared to
owner-occupants, absentee landlords are less likely to maintain their properties).
163 R. STRuYE, supra note 160, at 19; see also LARRY OZANNE & RAYMOND J. STRUYK,
HOUSING FROM THE EXISTING STOCK: COMPARATIVE, ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF OWNER-
OCCUPANTS AND LANDLORDS 24 (1976) ("[L]ow- to middle-income rental households
that switch to owner-occupancy will have higher levels of basic and other structural serv-
ices and will reside in better neighborhoods.").
164 See R. STRuYK, supra note 160, at 23.
165 See, e.g., Sean A. Burns, Outlook for the Economy and Real Estate, 2 REAL EST. OUT-
LOOK 2, 7 (1989) (median existing single-family home price declined 1.9% in August
1989, rising only 3.7% for the preceding year); ThomasJ. Lueck, New York Region's Hous-
ing: No Signs of Return to Boom, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989 at 1, col. 1 (sellers of homes in
New York metropolitan region must sometimes accept 20% less than they could have
gotten one year earlier); Robert A. Rosenblatt, Falling Home Prices May Hurt Banks, Gonza-
lez Warns, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 1989, at D-2, col I (House Banking Committee
chairman states that "[t]he entire country, including California, is 'beginning to get the
Texas taint' of falling real estate prices ... ").
166 See N. Gregory Mankiw & David N. Weil, The Baby Boom, The Baby Bust, And the
Housing Market, 19 REG. ScI. & URB. ECON. 19 (1989) (predicting that over the next two
decades "housing prices will fall to levels lower than observed at any time in recent
history."). If Mankiw and Weil's predictions are correct, excess supply and lower prices
may reduce both the cost of rental and owner-occupied homes, thereby helping to allevi-
ate the problem of housing affordability. Nevertheless, households who purchase
homes will suffer financial hardship as prices decline.
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Even in generally rising markets, housing affordable to low in-
come households would likely be located in depressed or transi-
tional neighborhoods where the risk of declining property values is
significant. Even in instances where the risk of price depreciation is
small, the illiquidity of real property investments might make home-
ownership inappropriate for households who must live at the mar-
gin.167 Homeownership also decreases the mobility of households,
making it more difficult for them to move to areas of greater em-
ployment opportunity. 16 8 Furthermore, one primary advantage of
homeownership over renting-its favorable treatment under federal
tax laws 169 -is probably irrelevant to most low income households
since most of the benefits are available only to households that have
a sufficiently large dollar amount of deductible expenses to justify
itemization. 170
The psychological and political benefits of homeownership are
even more difficult to assess objectively. Plenty of survey and anec-
dotal information documents the high utility many people derive
from owning their own homes. 171 Not having to worry about being
167 See P. MARCUSE, supra note 160, at 12.
168 Cf John D. Kasarda, Jobs, Migration, and Emerging Urban Mismatches, in URBAN
CHANGE AND POVERTY 148, 193 (Michael G.H. McGreary & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. eds.
1988) (arguing in favor of policies to improve the mobility of low income households
that are increasingly living in "culturally and economically isolated inner-city areas of
decline."). In addition to the illiquidity of real property investments, mobility might be
hampered by the psychological attachment of an owner to his or her home. Cf Mark
Fried, Grieving ForA Lost Home, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY
359-79 (James Q. Wilson ed. 1966) (discussing psychological problems created by invol-
untary displacement resulting from the urban renewal program). But cf. M. SCHILL & R.
NATHAN, supra note 121, at 112-13 (majority of renter households surveyed who were
displaced by private reinvestment prefer their current homes and neighborhoods to
their previous ones).
169 See supra note 6.
170 Among the tax deductions available to households that itemize their deductions
are mortgage interest payments, loan origination fees and real property taxes. Typi-
cally, the aggregate value of itemized deductions for low income households does not
justify itemization. See Dolbeare, supra note 6, at 268 (fewer than one-half of all home-
owners take mortgage interest and property tax deductions). Of course, landlords also
receive lucrative tax benefits under the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 167-68
(depreciation deductions). To the extent that housing markets are competitive, these
benefits should be passed through to tenants. Owner-occupants of all income levels
benefit from the failure by the federal government to tax imputed rental income. See
supra note 6.
171 See, e.g., EARL W. MORRIS & MARY WINTER, HOUSING, FAMILY, AND SociETY 286
(1978) (overwhelming proportion of empirical evidence supports proposition that
homeownership norm pervades all classes and racial and ethnic groups); CHARLES VERT
WILLIE, A NEW LOOK AT BLACK FAMILIEs 52 (2d ed. 1981) (black working class views
homeownership as an "indicator of respectability"); HousingAct of 1984, Part 4: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development, Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2861 (1985) ("Today, I feel so happy with my own
house seeing my own children playing in their own backyard; my husband coming home
from work parking his car in the driveway. I feel like a new person. Even if I win the
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evicted or forced out by rising rents undoubtedly creates a greater
sense of security and control over one's life. Nevertheless, home-
owners are not entirely free from the threat of external forces. Ris-
ing real estate taxes and maintenance expenses may make the cost
of owning a home as unaffordable as rising rents. In addition, the
relative psychological benefits of homeownership should not be
overstated; renters, including public housing tenants, typically re-
spond that they are very satisfied with their homes. 72
Homeownership does seem to be related to higher levels of
voter participation in elections, thus supporting the argument that
owning one's home may increase one's identification with and sense
of belonging to the political community.' 73 In addition, evidence
from Great Britain indicates that the political orientation of tenants
who purchased council housing became increasingly conservative' 74
New York Lottery, I do not sell my house.") (testimony ofJosephine Torres discussing
Nehemiah homeownership program).
172 See supra note 85.
173 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, HOMEOWNERSHIP: KEY TO THE AMERICAN
DREAm 22 (1988) (1986 survey shows that compared to renters, homeowners were more
likely to be registered to vote and to vote in elections); PHILIP K. PIELE &JOHN STUART
HALL, BUDGETS, BONDS, AND BALLOTS: VOTING BEHAVIOR IN SCHOOL FINANCIAL ELEC-
TIONS 44 (1973) (homeowners more likely to vote in school financial elections than rent-
ers); Paul William Kingston, John L.P. Thompson & Douglas M. Eichar, The Politics of
Homeownership, 12 AMER. POL. Q. 131, 146 (1984) (opinion surveys show homeownership
is associated with increased voting rates, but no other form of political participation).
Empirical studies also show that when socioeconomic variables are controlled for,
homeowners are more likely than renters to join voluntary organizations and take part in
neighborhood activities. See Terry C. Blum & Paul William Kingston, Homeownership And
Social Attachment, 27 Soc. PERSP. 159, 173 (1984) ("[H]omeowners are relatively more
apt to espouse traditional social values, join voluntary organizations, and to be en-
meshed in local neighborhood-based social networks."); Kevin R. Cox, Housing Tenure
And Neighborhood Activism, 18 URB. AFF. Q. 107, 115 (1982) ("[T]he effect of homeowner-
ship upon neighborhood activism is remarkably robust."). Most explanations of the rel-
atively high level of participation by homeowners suggest that homeowners seek to
protect the economic investment they have made in their housing. See Blum & Kingston,
supra, at 175 (homeowners have an incentive to enhance the general environment of
their investment). But see Cox, supra, at 117-18 (the high cost of relocation, rather than
investment protection, leads homeowners to participate in community affairs).
174 See ELIM PAPADAKIS & PETER TAYLOR-GOOBY, THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC
WELFARE 158 (1987) ("To some extent, the success of the Conservatives in capturing
the working-class vote can be explained in terms of their positive attitude towards owner
occupation."); cf Proceedings of Symposium on Privatization: The Assumptions and the Implica-
tions, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 585, 625 (1988) [hereinafter Proceedings on Symposium on Privatiza-
tion] (comment by Ellickson that homeowners are more likely to adopt conservative
views on issues such as local finance). But see Ted G.Jelen, The Impact of Home Ownership
on Whites' Racial Attitudes, 18 AMER. POL. Q. 208, 210-11 (1990) (homeownership unre-
lated to partisanship or presidential vote, but is related to existence of racist views);
Kingston, Thompson & Eichar, supra note 173, at 146-47 (opinion surveys show that
homeownership "does not have a regular and general conservatizing impact."). The
conservatizing tendency of homeownership is usually attributed to one of two related
theories. The home constitutes the major financial investment of most households and
may make the homeowner more likely to support protection of private property and
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as a result of the purchase.' 75
2. The Sale of Public Housing as a Matter of Housing Policy
Although the magnitude of benefits of becoming a homeowner
is hotly contested, homeownership would undoubtedly be advanta-
geous for some low income tenants. Nevertheless, the sale of public
housing to tenants is a particularly inappropriate way to achieve
these objectives. Although the British housing market and publicly
owned housing stock are strikingly different from our own,' 76 Brit-
maintenance of the status quo. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL
ORDER AND LAND USE IN AMERICA 73 (1977) ("homebuyer has a long-term vested inter-
est in the neighborhood, the community, and the maintenance of the household's own
property .... "); David Harvey, Land, Capital, and Class Struggle Around The Built Environ-
ment in Advanced Capitalist Societies, 6 POL. & Soc'Y 265, 272 (1976) (homeownership pro-
vides the allegiance of a segment of the working class to the principle of private
property); Michael E. Stone, Housing, Mortgage Lending, and the Contradictions of Capital in
MARXISM AND THE METROPOLIS 179, 186 (William K. Tabb & Larry Sawers eds. 1978)
(homeowners' interests become tied to those of landlords and lenders). Marxists and
neo-Marxists also suggest that homeownership promotes conservatism by fragmenting
the working class. See MATrHEW EDEL, ELLIOT D. SCLAR & DANIEL LURIA, SHAKEY PAL-
ACES: HOMEOWNERSHIP AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN BOSTON'S SUBURBANIZATION 193 (1984)
(homeownership in suburbia divided the working class into different strata, isolated
workers from their peers and furthered conservatism); Harvey, supra, at 272 (homeown-
ership fragments working class). I will leave the question of whether the increasing con-
servatism of tenants as they become homeowners is a prospect that should be eagerly
anticipated or ominously feared for others to resolve.
175 One additional advantage of the change of tenure from renter to owner, with
respect to publicly owned property, is allocative efficiency. Economic efficiency requires
property rights to be freely transferable so that the underlying resource can be used by
the person who values it most highly. Public housing is owned by PHAs under a con-
tractual obligation to maintain it as such for lengthy periods of time. To the extent that
transferring the property to the private sector releases it from this restraint on alienabil-
ity, allocative efficiency will be promoted. But see supra text accompanying note 146
(under most privatization proposals property would not be freely alienable for limited
period of time).
176 British council housing comprises a much greater proportion of its nation's total
housing stock than does American public housing. In 1981, just as the sale of council
housing was beginning to accelerate, 31%o of all British housing was owned and oper-
ated by the public sector compared to only 1.5%o of all American housing. See E. Jay
Howenstine, Converting Public Housing to Individual and Cooperative Ownership:
Lessons From Foreign Experience 4 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, 1983) (mimeo); Pit & van Vliet, supra note 64, at 201. On the whole, residents of
council housing are much higher up on the economic ladder than public housing ten-
ants. The average income of council housing tenants is only one-third below the median
income for owner-occupiers, and over one-half of all tenants are employed. See MICHAEL
BALL, HOUSING POLICY AND ECONOMIC POWER 272 (1983). Council housing is generally
in better condition than American public housing. Prior to commencement of the sales
program, only I percent of all units were deemed "unfit." See Gray, Consumption: Council
House Management, in STATE HOUSING IN BRITAIN 196, 199 (Stephen Merrit ed. 1979).
The stock of council housing also has proportionately more of the types of units most
people would prefer to purchase. Over 75%o of all council housing units are single fam-
ily homes, while less than 25%o of American public housing is composed of single family
accommodations. See Howenstine, supra, at 7; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
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ain's experience with the sale of council housing is, nonetheless,
instructive.
Since 1980, the British government has sold over one million
units of council housing to tenants. 177 As might be expected, the
tenants who purchase council housing tend to be middle-aged and
earn higher incomes than those who choose not to buy.'78 Among
the reasons for the concentration of sales among relatively affluent,
middle-aged tenants is the substantial income required to maintain
homes and meet monthly mortgage payments. In addition, there is
a greater likelihood that older tenants have lived in council housing
for a longer period of time and would therefore have had a greater
opportunity to upgrade their homes. 79 Empirical studies of council
housing sales have also consistently found similar patterns with re-
gard to the types and locations of homes that are most often
purchased. Tenants have purchased the more desirable single fam-
ily homes much more frequently than any other type of council
housing. 80 In addition, tenants have bought homes in outlying ar-
eas at much higher rates than homes in inner city locations.' 8 '
DEVELOPMENT, ALTERNATIVE OPERATING SUBSIDY SYSTEMS FOR PUBLIC HOUSING 3
(1982).
177 Selling The Projects, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Apr. 8, 1989, at 852.
178 Households that purchase council housing are more likely to be composed of
two wage earners, professionals, or skilled workers. They earn significantly higher in-
comes than do non-purchasers. See RAY FORREST & ALAN MURIE, SELLING THE WELFARE
STATE: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING 125-26 (1988) (among employed house-
holds, 78% of sitting tenant purchasers are skilled manual, intermediate non-manual or
professional employees, as compared to 62% of all council housing tenants; 76% of
purchasers are employed, compared to 35% of all tenants); LENNART LUNDOVIST, Hous-
ING POLICY & EQUALITY 126 (1986) ("[t]he typical tenant purchaser is in his mid-forties,
with adult children, and with an income higher than the average council tenant"); NJ.
Williams, J. Sewel & F. Twine, Council House Sales and Residualization, 15J. Soc. POL'Y 273,
276-79 (28% of purchasers as compared to only 6.4% of non-purchasers in Aberdeen,
Scotland had incomes over £150 per week). Purchasing tenants are also over-
represented in the 41-60 age cohort when compared to both all tenants and non-
purchasing tenants. See R. FORREST & A. MURIE, supra, at 126; Williams, Sewel & Twine,
supra, at 279.
179 Cf R. FORREST & A. MURIE, supra note 178, at 133-34 (discussing mobility within
council housing).
180 See id. at 120-21 (while flats comprise 30% of council housing stock, they consti-
tute only 5% of sales from 1981 to 1985); GREATER LONDON COUNCIL, COUNCIL HOUSE
SALES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING IN LONDON 7 (1984) (flats
comprise between 60-75% of London's council housing, but only 10% of sales to ten-
ants); Mike Barke, The Sale of Council Homes in Newcastle Upon Tyne: Some Early Results, N.
ECON. REV. 2, 5 (1983/1984); (same in Newcastle); Williams, Sewel & Twine, supra note
178, at 285 (sales in Aberdeen have been predominantly of better dwellings in more
popular areas).
181 See R. FORREST & A. MURIE, supra note 178, at 139-60 (examining geographic
patterns of sales in London, Liverpool and Birmingham); GREATER LONDON COUNCIL,
supra note 180, at 6 (while only 45% of London's council housing is located in the outer
boroughs, over 75% of sales have taken place there).
1990] PRIVATIZING FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE
Despite its widespread popularity, 8 2 the council housing sales
program has been intensely criticized on the ground that the sales
have led to the "residualization" of the public sector housing
stock.183 Critics fear that as better quality dwellings are sold to ten-
ants who earn the highest incomes, the council housing stock will
increasingly be occupied by a low income, marginalized popula-
tion.18 4 Once this occurs, council housing could lose the widespread
public support it has earned through the years.
Though American public housing has never enjoyed anything
approaching the popular support of council housing in Great Brit-
ain, it is likely that current proposals to extend to tenants a right to
buy their homes would result in similar, if less dramatic, changes.
Due to the small overall size of the public housing stock, the very
low incomes of public housing residents and the less desirable con-
figuration of many units, it is highly unlikely that the proportion of
tenants who would purchase their units would approach the level
achieved in Great Britain. Nevertheless, it is likely that, as in Great
Britain, the tenants who purchase their units would be those who
earn the highest incomes and those who live in the most desirable
units, typically single family homes or low density apartments
outside the inner city.185
Even if promoting homeownership among low income house-
182 After its initial opposition to council housing sales, the Labour Party joined the
Conservative Party in supporting legislation to liberalize the program. See R. FORREST &
A. MURIE, supra note 178, at 63-64; Rob Flynn, Political Acquiescence, Privatization and
Residualisation in British Housing Policy, 17J. Soc. POL'Y 289, 298-99 (1988).
183 PAUL N. BALCHIN, HOUSING POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 201-06 (1984); R. FOR-
REST & A. MURIE, supra note 178, at 65-85; John English, The Choice For Council Housing, in
THE FUTURE OF COUNCIL HOUSING 181, 190 (J. English, ed. 1982). But see David
Clapham & Duncan MacLennan, Residualisation of Public Housing: A Non-Issue, 32 HOUS-
ING REV. 9 (1983) (residualization has yet to be clearly established); Williams, Sewell &
Twine, supra note 178, at 290 (residualization is likely to have only a marginal effect).
184 Several critics of council housing sales argue that residualization will increasingly
make Britain's publicly owned housing stock resemble that of the United States. See R.
FORREST & A. MURIE, supra note 178, at 10-11 (citing earlier report of authors arguing
that sales of council housing could result in a public sector housing stock like the United
States); Valerie Karn, Private Housing at All Costs: Some Lessons From America, in THE FU-
TURE OF COUNCIL HOUSING, supra note 183, at 154-78 (British housing policy is creating
similar problems for council housing as American housing policy created for public
housing).
185 Experience with HUD's Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration thus far
supports the proposition that the most desirable units will be sold to relatively high
income public housing tenants. Half of the units sold as of February, 1989 were scat-
tered-site single family homes. See Maureen McCormick, The Sale of Public Houiing 4
(Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, Feb. 27, 1989). Households participating
in the sales program earned $7,500 to $30,000 per year, well above the median income
for all residents of public housing. See id. at 5; see also Results of Programs To Sell Units to
Public Housing Residents Examined, 16 HOUSING & DEv. REP. 896 (1989) (report by
Stegman that purchasing households had an average annual income of $18,568 and that
907o of households had at least one full-time wage earner).
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holds is a desirable objective of public policy, 186 giving public hous-
ing tenants a right to purchase their units is not the appropriate
approach to achieve this goal.187 Public housing frequently has been
criticized for violating principles of horizontal equity. At great ex-
pense, relatively few of the eligible pool of persons are housed,
while most receive no assistance whatsoever.' 88 Ironically, a sales
program such as the one proposed would only magnify the inequity.
Certain tenants, most of whom are likely to be the least needy,
would receive a windfall paid for by the taxpayers, based solely on
their good fortune in occupying a desirable public housing unit.
Other public housing tenants, who earn lower incomes or occupy
dilapidated units, would not benefit; many could be harmed. 189
The sale of better public housing units to higher income ten-
ants would harm existing and prospective tenants of public housing.
Occupants of public housing would lose the opportunity to upgrade
their current homes if the more spacious and desirable units were
sold. 190 Assuming no major new rental housing programs are en-
acted, 91 prospective tenants would have to wait even longer for
186 For a discussion of the somewhat equivocal case for low income homeownership,
see supra text accompanying notes 160-75.
187 To the extent that a major objective of pro-homeownership policies is to give
public housing tenants greater control over their living conditions, alternatives to selling
public housing exist. Congress recently passed legislation designed to encourage ten-
ants to assume the management of public housing themselves. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437r
(1988). For a discussion of the experience thus far with tenant management, see infra
text accompanying notes 291-94.
188 See, e.g., R. MTrrH, supra note 98, at 3 (comparing public housing program to an
"all-or-nothing 'lottery' "); Edgar 0. Olson & David M. Barton, The Benefits and Costs of
Public Housing In New York City, 20J. PuB. ECON. 299, 328 (1983) ("More than half of all
households are eligible for the program, but only a small fraction of those who would
like to participate are served ... a significant proportion of public housing tenants re-
ceive such large benefits that their effective incomes are greater than those of the
poorest ineligible families of the same size.").
189 One sales program that would not create similar problems of horizontal inequity
would be for the federal government to sell public housing to the highest bidder and
give the existing tenants rent certificates or vouchers to live elsewhere. Cf Proceedings of
Symposium on Privatization, supra note 174, at 625 (1988) (comment by Ellickson that
"[t]he simplest course would be to sell this housing in fee simple to the highest bid-
der"). Although such a program might be allocatively efficient, no proposal along these
lines has been given serious consideration due to the problems of involuntary displace-
ment that would inevitably result. In addition, as discussed supra text accompanying
notes 128-37, such a policy might be undesirable, even on efficiency grounds, because
public housing may be superior to demand-oriented subsidies in achieving certain policy
objectives.
190 Cf. Edward H. Kaplan, Tenant Assignments: How PHAs Fill Their Units, 42 J. Hous-
ING 13, 16-20 (1985) (tenants frequently accorded choice in selection of units).
191 This assumption seems warranted in the current period of federal budgetary aus-
terity. See DAVID C. SCHWARTZ, RICHARD C. FERLAUTO & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, A NEW
HOUSING POLICY FOR AMERICA 47 (1988) (total budget authority of HUD was cut 57%
from 1980 to 1987).
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public housing.' 92 Current and prospective tenants and PHAs
would also likely be harmed by the combination of an increase in
average operating costs and a decrease in average rent payments.
Currently, public housing tenants who earn above-average incomes
and those who live in better quality units indirectly subsidize the
poorest tenants and those who live in buildings requiring the great-
est maintenance. This cross-subsidization results from two factors.
First, since tenants pay only a fixed proportion of their income as
rent, those with higher incomes pay more than those who earn less.
Second, the cost of housing tenants in dwellings that require only
minor maintenance is much less than the cost of maintaining units
in dilapidated buildings. Therefore, a portion of the rent paid by a
tenant living in better accommodations may be used by the housing
authority to pay for the maintenance of apartments in poorer condi-
tion. A program to sell public housing would likely result in the loss
of these cross-subsidies. Higher income tenants would be among
those most likely to purchase their units, as would tenants who live
in homes that are in the best condition. Even though total operat-
ing expenses would decrease as a result of the sale of housing, rent
revenue would fall disproportionately. PHAs, faced with operating
the most expensive segment of their housing stock as their rent rev-
enue simultaneously declined, would have no alternative but to con-
serve funds by reducing services and deferring maintenance.
Although PHAs would receive some revenue from the sale of their
housing, it is unlikely to offset the shortfall created by the loss of
cross-subsidies.19 3
192 The annual turnover rate for public housing is 14%. See M. STEGMAN, supra note
86, at I. The replacement housing provisions of the Bush Administration's HOPE pro-
posals might alleviate this problem. Nevertheless, the requirement that units sold to
households who are not lower income be replaced may be illusory. Under the proposed
legislation, comparatively short-term vouchers would constitute replacement housing.
In addition, housing that would have been provided regardless of the existence of a sales
program would be counted as replacement housing. See supra note 152. Furthermore,
HOPE requires replacement only when transferred units have not been restricted to
"lower" income buyers. The Housing Act defines a lower income family as a family
whose income does not exceed 80% of the median income for the area. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437a (b) (1) (West Supp. 1989). Under federal rules, however, public housing is
predominantly designed to house "very low-income" households. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437n (West Supp. 1989) (no more than 5 to 25 % of public housing may be rented to
lower income families other than very low-income families). A very low-income family
earns less than 50% of the area median family income. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a (b) (1)
(West Supp. 1989). Therefore, public housing units sold pursuant to HOPE would not
have to be replaced even though their use would not be restricted to people whose
incomes were comparable to those served under the public housing program.
193 Revenue from the sale of public housing units to tenants would probably be in-
sufficient to alleviate the increased financial distress of PHAs, since most units would be
sold at only a fraction of their value. Furthermore, purchasers would most likely not be
required to pay more than nominal amounts as downpayments, with the remainder of
the funds advanced by the PHA in the form of purchase money mortgages at below-
925
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A public housing sales program would also adversely affect the
location of low income households. I have demonstrated in Part II
that public housing can play a vital and cost-effective role in facilitat-
ing economic and, especially, racial integration.19 4 Yet it is precisely
the housing units that serve this purpose-single family and low
density developments in areas outside inner city neighborhoods-
that would be among the first to be sold.' 95
In addition to the negative effect of a public housing sales pro-
gram on prospective and remaining tenants, tenants who purchase
their dwellings may also be harmed as a result of privatization. Ten-
ants who live in public housing, for the most part, earn very low
incomes. 196 It is likely that most would be unable to afford the costs
of homeownership, which would include maintenance, debt service
and real property taxes.' 97 Nevertheless, experience with other fed-
market interest rates. See H.R. 4628 (requiring PHAs to loan funds to tenant-purchasers
at interest rates no higher than 70% of the market interest rate); Dep't of City and Re-
gional Planning, supra note 149, at 22-24 (downpayments required from purchasers par-
ticipating in Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration range from 0 to 6% of
sales price). Because whatever revenue the sales generate would be paid over a lengthy
period of time, its present value is likely to be relatively small. Selling public housing to
tenants would also generate revenues from real property taxes. Nevertheless, these rev-
enues would generally be collected by the municipal government for the jurisdiction in
which the housing is located, rather than by the PHA.
The Bush Administration's HOPE proposals would exacerbate the potential finan-
cial difficulties of PHAs since only one-half of the sales revenues could be retained by
PHAs, and even that money would be restricted to subsidizing the costs of the home-
ownership program. See supra note 152.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
195 These units would still serve the purpose of economic and racial integration as
long as the current residents remained. Nevertheless, it is likely that once the period
during which the government can recapture the sale price lapses, many of these house-
holds would sell their property to take advantage of their capital gains.
196 See supra text accompanying note 75.
197 See Letter from Robert McKay to Office of General Counsel (December 21,
1984), reprinted in Homeownership Demonstration Program (Part 2): Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 193-95
(1986) (illustrating increase of costs that homeownership would entail for purchasers of
public housing in Boston).
The preliminary results of a HUD-sponsored evaluation of the Public Housing
Homeownership Demonstration, see supra note 149, suggest that tenants who purchase
public housing units would require substantial continuing subsidies. Tenants purchas-
ing public housing under the Demonstration bore little resemblance to the average pub-
lic housing resident. Over three quarters of the households were employed and their
average incomes were two to four times the average for all public housing residents.
Nevertheless, purchasers in five of the twelve sales programs have encountered financial
problems. After the passage of one year, between 10 to 15 % of all buyers have de-
faulted or are delinquent with respect to their mortgage loans. Almost one-third of all
buyers have expressed the view that mortgage payments are a strain on their budgets.
See Michael Stegman, Presentation to Housing Conference, Wharton Real Estate Center,
University of Pennsylvania (March 2, 1990). The likelihood that purchasers would re-
quire continuing financial assistance was recognized by the Bush Administration in its
HOPE proposals. The proposed legislation contemplates continuing financial assist-
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eral homeownership programs, and preliminary results from the
Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration 98 indicate that
many of these tenants would become caught up in the rhetoric of
empowerment and, lacking sufficient information about the realities
of homeownership, would attempt to purchase their units. One
would therefore expect that significant numbers of purchasers
would default on their mortgage loans. After foreclosure, not only
would the purchasers probably lose whatever equity they had accu-
mulated in their homes, but they would also have to find accommo-
dations in the private housing market at rents that would probably
exceed the amount they had previously paid for public housing.' 99
A recent study completed by the General Accounting Office
emphasizes the risk that tenants who purchase public housing might
encounter serious difficulty in affording the costs of homeowner-
ship.200 The GAO report examined the feasibility of the planned
conversion to tenant ownership of Washington, D.C.'s Kenilworth-
Parkside development. The sale of Kenilworth-Parkside has often
been referred to by privatization advocates as a model for an ex-
panded public housing sales program.20 ' Despite the expenditure of
enormous amounts of federal modernization funds in advance of
the sale20 2 and the commitment of substantial federal funds to sub-
sidize the operation of the housing after the conversion, 20 3 the
GAO, using conservative assumptions, concluded that the project
would not be able to support itself after thirteen years had
elapsed. 20 4
ance to purchasers of public housing. See supra note 152. Although this assistance might
make a sales program somewhat more feasible, it magnifies the already considerable
problem of horizontal inequity inherent in current public housing homeownership pro-
posals. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
198 Many low income households purchased homes under the Section 235 Mortgage
Interest Subsidy Program in the 1960s and 1970s. A large number of these households
defaulted on their mortgages and lost their homes to foreclosure. See infra note 296.
199 This type of scenario appears to be afflicting some purchasers of British council
housing. See, e.g., Penny Symon, Home-owning Dreams That End in Nightmare, Daily Tele-
graph, Oct. 31, 1988, at 23 (national survey by British government indicates that one in
five purchasers of council housing units are in serious financial trouble).
200 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: PLANNED KENILWORTH-
PARKSIDE SALE RAISES ISSUES FOR FUTURE TRANSACTIONS (1989).
201 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVrIIZATION, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing
success of Kenilworth-Parkside in the context of a recommendation to sell public hous-
ing); "Remarks By the President to National Association of Realtors," 5 (Dallas, Texas,
Nov. 10, 1989) (Kenilworth-Parkside is an example of tenants seeking "to recapture the
American dream of home ownership.").
202 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 200, at 33-34 (HUD has spent an
average of $53,886 per unit to modernize Kenilvorth-Parkside housing).
203 See id. at 41-42 (tenants of Kenilworth-Parkside will require continuing federal
housing subsidies for at leat five years after sale).
204 See id. at 50. The author of the report assumed that both income and expenses
would increase at 5% per year.
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A probable long-run result of a public housing sales program
would be the further weakening of support for maintaining the re-
maining stock of public sector housing. As the best units were sold
and the highest income tenants became homeowners, it is likely that
public housing would become increasingly racially segregated and
concentrated in inner city neighborhoods. Due to the increasing fi-
nancial hardships likely to be faced by PHAs, as well as an image of
public housing unlikely to command sympathy among the white
middle class majority, the sale of some public housing might ulti-
mately lead to the abandonment of the remaining stock. Not only
would the abandonment of the public housing program squander a
seventy billion dollar public investment, 20 5 but it would also pre-
clude public housing from achieving those objectives for which it is
suited.
IV
THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT To REQUIRE
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING
Not surprisingly, PHAs have, to a large extent, opposed pro-
grams which would enable tenants to purchase their units.2 06 Rec-
ognizing that most PHAs would not willingly sell their housing to
tenants, proponents of privatization have advanced proposals which
would compel PHA participation. Though many alternative ap-
proaches exist to induce PHAs to participate in a public housing
sales program, 207 proponents of privatization have uniformly advo-
cated legislation that would require PHAs to sell their units to will-
ing tenants. 208 In this section, I examine the likely constitutional
challenges to such a mandatory public housing sales program. Un-
205 See COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES, supra note 63, at 7 (value of
public housing estimated at $ 70 billion).
206 See, e.g., Homeownership Demonstration Program (Part 2): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 193-95
(1986) (letter by Council of Large Public Housing Authorities opposing several ele-
ments of homeownership demonstration); Homeownership Demonstration Program: Hearing
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 99th Cong.
1st Sess. 80-86 (1985) (statement by National Association of Housing and Redevelop-
ment Officials criticizing homeownership demonstration).
207 Congress might, instead of mandating the sale of public housing, encourage
PHAs to sell their housing to tenants. This legislation could follow either a carrot or a
stick approach. Public housing authorities that agreed to sell their housing to tenants
could be paid additional subsidies by the federal government. Alternatively, federal
assistance already received by PHAs which is not contractually guaranteed, such as oper-
ating subsidies and modernization grants, might be conditioned upon a PHA agreeing
to sell public housing to its tenants.
208 See, e.g., H.R. 4628, supra note 3; S. 3030, supra note 3; H.R. 6317, supra note 3;
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 17-18; Ferrara, supra note 2,
at 295-96. The proposed legislation bears many similarities to the "right to buy" provi-
sions of Great Britain's Housing Act of 1980. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
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like a voluntary sales program or a program which conditioned the
receipt of discretionary federal subsidies on a PHA's agreement to
sell its housing to tenants, 20 9 legislation granting tenants of public
The Bush Administration's HOPE proposals also contemplate a mandatory public hous-
ing sales program. See supra note 152.
209 Legislation which conditioned discretionary federal subsidies on PHAs' agree-
ment to sell their housing to tenants might be subject to constitutional attack under the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which limits the ability of the government to
grant benefits to its citizens on the condition that they relinquish constitutionally pro-
tected rights. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreward"
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, And the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1988); Kreimer, supra note 49; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1989).
As an instrumentality of the state, a PHA could argue that requiring it to sell its
housing as a condition of continued receipt of operating or modernization subsidies
would violate principles of federalism. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 72 (1936)
(invalidating Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 which subsidized farmers who re-
duced their crops on the ground that the federal government may not "purchas[e] with
federal funds submission to Federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states").
Nevertheless, no case since Butler has invalidated a condition tied to an exercise of the
federal government's spending power on the ground of federalism. See Sullivan, supra,
at 1431. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that federalism concerns do not con-
stitute a major barrier to conditions attached to federal spending programs. See, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding legislation that directed the
withholding of federal highway funds from states which permit the purchase or posses-
sion of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of twenty-one, while noting that
certain coercive conditions which constitute compulsion would not be sustained); cf.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (in the absence of a
defect in the political process, federal courts will not protect states from exercises of
federal regulation based upon principles of federalism).
A second line of federal cases implies that conditions impacting on constitutional
rights which are tied to the receipt of government benefits must be related, to some
degree, to the benefits provided. See South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 208 (requirement that
states raise minimum drinking age to 21 is "directly related to one of the main purposes
for which highway funds are expended-safe interstate travel.") In one recent case, Nol-
Ian v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Court held that conditioning
the issuance of a building permit on the conveyance by a beachfront property owner of a
lateral easement to the public constituted a taking of property without compensation. In
Nollan, the Court observed that the state did not have the power to order the Nollans to
convey the easement without paying them just compensation. In addition, the Court did
not seriously question whether the Coastal Commission had the power to deny the
building permit on the ground that the development blocked views of the ocean. Never-
theless, the Court held that the condition (the dedication of the lateral easement) was
invalid because it was not substantially related to the purposes that would be served by
denial of a permit. PHAs might argue by analogy that requiring them to sell their prop-
erty to tenants would not be substantially related to the purposes that justify a cut-off of
operating or modernization subsidies. Such an argument would likely face an uphill
battle on two grounds. First, the federal government could plausibly assert that the
condition was, in fact, substantially related to the purposes served by cutting off operat-
ing and modernization subsidies-the conservation of federal revenue. Second, Nollan
might be distinguished on the ground that the condition in that case was attached to an
exercise of the police power rather than the spending power. Much of the commentary
following Nollan has suggested that the Court's decision reflects a view that police power
restrictions on the exercise of property rights demand a higher level ofjudicial scrutiny
than mere rationality review. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrec-
tion, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 38 (Nollan may be read as imposing an intermediate level of
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housing the right to purchase their units over the objections of
PHAs would likely run afoul of constitutional provisions which pro-
tect owners of property from uncompensated takings and the denial
of due process.
Doctrinal analysis of these constitutional claims varies depend-
ing on how the property interest of the PHA is defined. Formalisti-
cally, a PHA's interest in its stock of public housing may be
described as an estate in fee simple.210 PHAs hold record title to
their public housing, and the duration of their estate in land is po-
tentially infinite.
On the other hand, a PHA's interest in public housing is unlike
most types of fee simple estates. The federal government pays for
all of the capital costs of the housing as well as for continuing oper-
ating and modernization subsidies. Although the PHA manages the
day-to-day operation of the property, it is subject to extensive fed-
eral regulation governing areas such as tenant selection, 21' compu-
tation of utility charges2 1 2 and eviction procedures. 213 In the event
that the PHA fails to adhere to its statutory and contractual obliga-
tions, the federal government has the right to take over ownership
and management of the public housing. 214 In substance, a PHA may
resemble a party to an executory contract more than an owner of a
fee simple estate. The federal government agrees that it will under-
take certain financial and regulatory obligations over a period of
forty years. In turn, the PHA agrees to construct and operate public
housing pursuant to federal regulation on the condition that at the
judicial scrutiny on government regulation of property). On the other hand, courts treat
governmental decisions to subsidize or not subsidize a particular activity with deference,
even if that activity may be constitutionally protected from state interference. See Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050-53 (1989) (upholding state
law restricting abortions in public facilities and abortions conducted by.2ublic employ-
ees); Harris v. McRae, 448 US. 297, 316-19 (1980) (upholding federal law restricting use
of Medicaid program to pay for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977)
("There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative activity. . . . Constitutional concerns are
greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to
encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.");
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 99 (1976) (upholding expenditure limitations for candi-
dates who receive public financing).
210 "An estate in fee simple is an estate which... has a duration which is potentially
infinite or [which is] terminable upon an event which is certain to occur but is not certain
to occur within a fixed or computable period of time or within the duration of any speci-
fied life of lives; or [which is] terminable upon an event which is certain to occur, pro-
vided such estate is one left in the conveyor, subject to defeat upon the occurrence of
the stated event in favor of a person other than the conveyor .... RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 14 (1936).
211 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204-960.207 (1988).
212 24 C.F.R. § 965 (1988).
213 24 C.F.R. § 247 (1988).
214 ACC § 501.
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expiration of the forty year term, the PHA will own the property free
and clear of federal requirements. 2 15
Regardless of whether a PHA's property interest in public hous-
ing is characterized as a fee simple estate or a contractual right, a
requirement that it sell its stock of public housing at deep discounts
to tenants would violate the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
Under the just compensation clause, property may not be taken by
the federal government without just compensation. In addition, the
fifth amendment protects against federal government impairments
of its own contracts.
A. Taking of Fee Simple Interest
The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without the
payment of just compensation. 21 6 Although the just compensation
clause refers only to "private" property, federal courts have re-
quired the United States to compensate states and state subdivi-
sions, such as local governments and public authorities, 217 when it
takes their property. 21 8 Similarly, the federal government may not
take the property of a PHA without paying just compensation.
215 Litigants frequently have sought to characterize PHAs as mere instrumentalities
or agents of the federal government. Courts, however, have usually maintained that
PHAs do retain an independent existence, separate from the federal government, as a
fee simple owner of property or as a party to a contractual relationship. See, e.g., Corre-
lated Dev. Corp. v. United States, 556 F.2d 515, 519-22 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (HUD not liable
on contracts executed by PHA merely because of its supervisory role as specified in the
Annual Contribution Contract); Perez v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D.P.R.
1978), aft'd, 594 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1979) (PHA is independent contractor rather than an
agent or employee of federal government, thereby insulating United States from vicari-
ous tort liability); Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692, 693, 695 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 555
F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977) (PHA is fee owner of public
housing and federal government is neither equitable nor real owner). But see Commis-
sioner of Labor & Indus. v. Lawrence Hous. Auth., 358 Mass. 202, 210, 261 N.E.2d 331,
336 (1970) (PHA is not subject to state competitive bidding requirements because under
state law a PHA is acting as an agent of the federal government).
216 "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
217 Public authorities are deemed to be subdivisions of the state in which they are
located, deriving all of their power and authority from the state. See 1 EUGENE McQuIL-
LIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORrONs 200 (3d ed. 1987); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw §§ 6, 13 (1982).
218 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984) ("[I]t is most rea-
sonable to construe the reference to 'private property' in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local governments when it is
condemned by the United States."); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946)
(condemnation of local property for federal post office and customhouse); Michael H.
Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA.
L. REv. 829, 841-88 (1989) (just compensation should be required for federal takings of
state and local property).
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There is little doubt that the federal government has the power
to condemn public housing and sell it to tenants at a fraction of its
fair market value. Since the late nineteenth century, courts have up-
held the federal government's exercise of its implied power of emi-
nent domain with respect to state and local property. 219 The major
limitations on the federal government's eminent domain power are
the requirements that the taking be for a "public use" and that just
compensation be provided to the condemnee.220
A federal requirement that PHAs transfer title of public hous-
ing to tenants almost certainly would satisfy the public use require-
ment of the just compensation clause. Throughout much of the first
half of the twentieth century, federal courts had difficulty deciding
whether the government purpose necessitating a condemnation of
property was public or private.221 Since the New Deal, however, the
Supreme Court has shown great deference to legislative determina-
tions of public use. In Berman v. Parker222 and Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff223 the Supreme Court approved the exercise of
eminent domain when the property condemned would ultimately be
transferred to private individuals or entities. In Berman, the Court
approved the condemnation of slum properties for eventual rede-
velopment or sale to private interests. 224 In Midkif, the Court up-
held a program enacted by Hawaii to condemn residential property
owned by a handful of landlords for eventual sale to tenants.225 In
219 See Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., 32 F. 9 (1887), appeal dismissed, 140 U.S.
699 (1891). In Stockton, a federal appeals court upheld a federal law authorizing the
condemnation of state property for the construction of a railroad bridge. The court
observed that requiring the United States government to obtain the state's consent prior
to appropriating its property would permit the state to stand in the way of the federal
government's exercise of its constitutionally delegated powers. For a discussion of
Stockton and the justification for federal eminent domain powers with respect to private
and public property, see Schill, supra note 218, at 833-37.
220 There may also be a requirement that the federal government provide the con-
demnee with procedural due process. See United States v. Holmes, 414 F. Supp. 831,
840 (D. Md. 1976) (federal government may condemn state property provided it ad-
heres to due process and just compensation requirements of fifth amendment). For a
discussion of whether states and localities are entitled to protection under the due pro-
cess clause, see infra note 246.
221 Compare United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky.),
aft'd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. granted, 296 U.S. 567 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297
U.S. 726 (1936) (federal condemnation for publialy owned housing is unconstitutional)
with Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1938) (taking of land for
publicly owned housing satisfied public use test).
222 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
223 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
224 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
225 The purpose of the Hawaiian ordinance was to break up the concentrated land-
holding of residential property which was thought to contribute to inflated housing
prices. Under the ordinance, upon petition by a minimum number of eligible tenants in
a development tract, the Hawaii Housing Authority would hold hearings to decide
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so doing, the Court set forth an extremely deferential standard
against which public use challenges to condemnations would be
judged: as long as the exercise of the eminent domain power "is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose," 226 it will meet
the requirements of the just compensation clause.
Requiring PHAs to transfer public housing units to tenants
would almost certainly meet the standard set forth in Midkif. En-
abling tenants to become homeowners is rationally related to a
number of conceivable public policies including transferring income
to public housing tenants, fostering neighborhood stability and re-
lieving the federal government of its obligation to pay operating and
modernization subsidies. 227 Indeed, recent proposals to privatize
public housing bear a resemblance to the land redistribution pro-
gram at issue in Midkif. In both instances, the public entity requires
a landlord to transfer property which will eventually be owned by
existing tenants. One important difference between the two pro-
grams, however, is that no proposal to privatize public housing pro-
vides for the payment of compensation to the current owners.
Under a recent Supreme Court ruling, United States v. 50 Acres of
Land,228 a public condemnee is "presumptively" entitled to the
same amount of compensation as a similarly situated private prop-
erty owner-the fair market value of the property taken. 229 Since
under most privatization proposals the PHA would receive only a
fraction of the property's fair market value from the tenant, the fed-
eral government must, under the just compensation clause, pay the
difference. If a court were to base fair market value compensation
upon the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller for
comparable housing, the amount of compensation could be sub-
stantial. However, public housing is unlike housing typically sold in
the market. Statutes and contracts prohibit a PHA from selling its
housing to the highest bidder during the forty year period in which
it is obligated to operate the project as low income housing.23 0 To
whether to acquire the subject property. If the Authority determined that the acquisi-
tion would further the public purposes underlying the act, it would condemn the prop-
erty and pay the condemnee compensation. The Authority would then sell the
condemned properties to the tenants. In practice, the funds paid to the condemnees for
their property were supplied entirely by the tenant-purchasers. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
233-34.
226 Id. at 241; see also id. at 240 ("The 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.").
227 For a discussion of the ostensible public purposes served by privatizing the pub-
lic housing stock, see supra text accompanying notes 153-59.
228 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
229 Id. at 31.
230 See 42 U.S.C. § 143 7p (Supp. V 1987) (limitations on disposition of public hous-
ing); ACG Part II § 506 (if public housing is acquired by a third party a substantial de-
fault will occur under ACG); U.S. Dep't of HUD, Declaration of Trust (March 1967)
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compensate the PHA for the property's fair market value based
upon comparable sales of similar properties might lead to over-
compensation.
An alternative method of computing fair market value compen-
sation would be to value the property in a manner similar to prop-
erty encumbered by a restrictive covenant. In condemnation
proceedings, an owner of property subject to a restrictive covenant
is usually paid the market value of his or her property subject to the
encumbrance. 23 t In effect, compensation for PHAs would be based
not on the price a buyer would pay for housing that could be rented
to anyone, but instead on the value of property that would have to
be operated as low income housing for a period of years. Depend-
ing on the number of years remaining until the termination of the
PHA's obligations under the ACC, the marketevalue of the property
computed according to this method could be substantial or non-
existent. 232
Upon reflection, neither method of computing compensation
for public housing based on fair market value seems appropriate.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the primary objec-
tive of the just compensation clause is to achieve indemnification, to
put the condemnee "in as good a position pecuniarily as if his prop-
erty had not been taken." 23 3 Providing the PHA with the value of
the property as if unencumbered might lead to over-compensation,
whereas providing it with the value of the housing as encumbered
might leave it under-compensated. The apparent inadequacy of the
fair market value concept as the sole criterion for computing com-
pensation for public housing may be explained by the simple obser-
vation that PHAs own property not for its economic or fungible
value,23 4 but instead to serve the public interest of their communi-
(document executed by PHA and HUD in which PHA agrees that HUD can require PHA
to refrain from transferring public housing).
231 See Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 182 So. 2d 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966) (compensation for property encumbered by restrictive covenant is value of
property as encumbered without consideration of the chance for removal of the
encumbrance).
232 PHAs operate some public housing at a loss. Therefore, to compute its fair mar-
ket value according to the method described in the text would require that the present
value of its market value as unrestricted property at the termination of the ACC be ad-
ded to the present value of the losses likely to be incurred by the PHA during the re-
maining years of the ACC. If the term of the ACC has many years remaining, the sum of
these values could be zero or a negative number.
233 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); see also Almota Farmers Eleva-
tor & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-78 (1973); United States v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). But see United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441
U.S. 506, 510-11 (1979) (Court acknowledges that it has failed to give principle of in-
demnification "its full and literal force").
234 Cf. MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 991-1013
(1982) (distinguishing between fungible and personal property).
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ties. Public housing may have little or no market value; yet, the un-
willingness of many PHAs to part with it voluntarily23 5 demonstrates
that it has a "public" value which is not captured by a fair market
value criterion.
I have argued elsewhere 23 6 that the distinctive functions served
by publicly owned property justify a compensation method different
from fair market value. Due to concerns of federalism 23 7 and alloca-
tive efficiency, 238 public property owners such as PHAs should be
entitled to an amount in excess of fair market value when they can
demonstrate that the property taken provided a benefit which would
not be as fully provided after condemnation. In such a case, the
PHA should be entitled to the amount it would cost to replace the
condemned housing less accumulated depreciation.23 9 Neverthe-
less, in certain circumstances, the PHA and the community it serves
will not be harmed by the sale of the units to tenants either because
of an excess supply of public housing or the fact that low income
households continue to live in the housing after the transfer of own-
ership. Compensation in these cases is still necessary to assure that
the government does not take resources for its own use that are
more socially valuable in the hands of the PHA. To promote alloca-
tive efficiency and ensure that the federal government bears the full
cost of its actions, 240 the PHA should, in these cases, be entitled to
the. market value of the housing as encumbered by the ACC.241
235 Public housing authorities have been at the forefront of opposition to public
housing sales programs. See supra text accompanying note 206.
236 See Schill, supra note 218, at 892-900.
237 Compensation for intergovernmental takings is justified as a prophylactic rule to
protect states and regions from federal exploitation. See id. at 880-88.
238 Compensation for intergovernmental condemnees is also justified as necessary
to prevent fiscal illusion. If the government were able to take property without paying
its market value to the owners, government might substitute condemned property for
other inputs that might be less valuable to society. Compensation forces the govern-
ment to bear the real costs of its actions. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 3.6 (3d ed. 1986) (compensation for private entities necessary to prevent fiscal
illusion); Schill, supra note 218, at 859-61 (compensation for public entities necessary to
prevent fiscal illusion).
239 See Schill, supra note 218, at 897-900. The Bush Administration's HOPE propos-
als provide for replacement housing when units of public housing are sold without re-
strictions that future purchasers be lower income households. See supra note 152. Under
some circumstances, this requirement may function as a form of in-kind compensation
satisfying my suggested compensation rule. Nevertheless, the legislation's replacement
housing requirements may be illusory. See supra note 192. It is also questionable
whether in-kind compensation would satisfy the fair market value requirement of 50
Acres of Land. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
240 For a description of the concept of fiscal illusion, see supra note 238.
241 Fair market value is a necessary minimum for just compensation to prevent the
problem of fiscal illusion. See supra note 238. To prevent the federal government from
using the property to further a less socially beneficial purpose than its current use, the
minimum award should be equal to the property's current economic value to the PHA.
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B. Impairment of Contract
DTJA S 'property interest i its Stock ufpub chousing may, in
substance, be characterized as an interest in an executory contract in
which it agrees to build and operate public housing subject to fed-
eral regulation for a period of forty years in return for unrestricted
ownership at the termination of the ACC.242 When the interest of
the PHA is conceptualized as an interest in an executory contract, a
requirement by the federal government that the PHA sell its public
housing to tenants at deep discounts may be seen as an impairment
of the PHA's rights or as a repudiation by the federal government of
its contractual obligations under the ACC.
The constitutional source of doctrines prohibiting the federal
government from repudiating its own contracts is somewhat un-
clear. Article I, section 10 of the Constitution prohibits states from
passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts.1 243 Neither
the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights contains a parallel provision
with respect to federal impairments of contracts,244 and the
Supreme Court has often observed that the contract clause does not
apply to the federal government.245 Nevertheless, apparently rely-
ing on the due process 246 and just compensation clauses of the fifth
242 See supra text accompanying notes 211-15.
243 "No State shall.., pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 10.
244 See generally Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study
in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
267 (1988) (analyzing why the text of the contract clause applies only to states and the
just compensation clause applies only to the federal government).
245 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S.
451, 473 n.25 (1985); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,
732-33 (1984).
246 There is some question as to whether the protections of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment extend to state subdivisions such as PHAs. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966), South Carolina asserted due process claims
with respect to certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The Court dismissed the
state's due process claims on the ground that the word "person" in the context of the
due process clause did not include states. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has implied, and lower federal courts have held, that even though
states might not be persons under the due process clause, state subdivisions such as
public authorities are entitled to its protections. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1969) (holding that HUD circular does not violate due
process clause); Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 709 F. Supp. 1411, 1420-22
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (in denying motion for relief from judgment, court holds that the Ohio
Student Loan Commission is distinguishable from the state and protected by the due
process clause), rev'd on other grounds, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990); Housing Auth. of
King v. Pierce, 701 F. Supp. 844, 850 n. 12 (D.D.C. 1988), amended on other grounds, 711 F.
Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1989) (rejecting HUD's argument that a PHA is not entitled to due
process protections). But cf City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C.
1980) (on motion for reconsideration, court holds that municipality is not a person
under due process clause).
Regardless of whether PHAs are entitled to the protections of the due process
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amendment, the Court has repeatedly held that the federal govern-
ment may not freely impair its own contractual obligations. 247
An analysis of federal impairment of its own contractual obliga-
tions begins with the question of whether a contract exists in the
first place. Frequently, the federal government enacts policies or
programs which, unlike contracts, are subject to revision and repeal.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
way Co.,248 the Supreme Court set forth guidelines for determining
whether a statute creates contractual rights: "[A]bsent some clear
indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually,
the presumption is that 'a law is not intended to create private con-
tractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued
until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.' ",249 However, if the
statute itself provides for the execution of a written contract on be-
half of the government, the Court has noted that the obligation is
clear and binding. 250
Even in circumstances where a federal statute contemplates the
execution of agreements between the federal government and third
parties, the obligations of the government may not always be bind-
ing. In Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment,251
state and local governments challenged an amendment to the Social
Security Act of 1935.252 Under that statute, state and local govern-
ments could voluntarily participate in the social security system by
executing an agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. The Act also permitted the governments to terminate
their agreements and withdraw from the system upon two years' ad-
clause, they are nonetheless constitutionally protected against contract repudiations.
The Supreme Court has held that the bar to federal government repudiation of its own
contracts is an element of the protections created by the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (property rights
arising out of a contract with the federal government are protected by the just compen-
sation and due process clauses); Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723,
727 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (same); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1341 (7th
Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984). The Court has repeatedly held that
states and state subdivisions are protected under the just compensation clause. See supra
text accompanying notes 217-18.
247 See Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1969); Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579
(1934). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 268-69.
248 470 U.S. 451 (1985). In National R.R. Passenger Corp., the Court determined that
an act of Congress establishing the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Am-
trak") and providing for the transfer of passenger service obligations from private rail-
roads to Amtrak did not establish contractual obligations between the federal
government and private railroads.
249 Id. at 466-67 (citing Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)).
250 Id. at 466.
251 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
252 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. (West 1983).
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vance notice. The option to terminate was contained in each of the
written agreements executed by the Secretary and the state and lo-
cal governments. In 1983, however, Congress amended the Act by
repealing the termination provision, thereby denying states and lo-
calities the ability to withdraw from the system.255
In Bowen, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision
that the 1983 amendment constituted a taking of property.
Although its opinion is not a model of clarity, 254 the Court seems to
have based its decision on two principles. First, the Court stated
that the termination right bore little resemblance to a property right
under the fifth amendment. The Court particularly emphasized the
existence of a reservation clause in the Act permitting Congress "to
alter, amend, or repeal any provision of the Act.' 255 In finding that
the agreements with the Secretary incorporated the provisions of
the Act, the Court held that Congress had the power to amend or
abolish the termination right without effecting a taking of
property. 256
The Court's second rationale for not finding a taking is more
puzzling. The Court observed that the federal government has the
power to enter into contracts that confer vested rights as well as the
duty to honor those rights. 257 Nevertheless, the Court noted that it
was reluctant to hold that the sovereign had waived its right to exer-
cise its sovereign powers. According to the Court, "contractual ar-
rangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is a party,
'remain subject to subsequent legislation' by the sovereign." 258 It is
unlikely that the Court intended this language to be taken literally,
because its application would result in the federal government never
being bound contractually. Such a result would contravene several
precedents 259 cited approvingly by the Court in Bowen as well as
253 See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 48.
254 McConnell, supra note 244, at 273 ("The Court's reasoning is somewhat
unclear .... ).
255 See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)).
256 Id. at 54-56; see also American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 182-84
(7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984) (agreements between health care provid-
ers and federal government, entered into pursuant to Hill-Burton Act, were open-ended
and incorporated statutory terms); South Carolina State Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (4th Cir. 1990) (Congress reserved right to amend
agreements with state agency).
257 Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52.
258 Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982)).
259 The Court cited the cases of Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) and
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) for the proposition that the federal govern-
ment has the duty to honor its contractual obligations. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52. For a
discussion of these two cases, see infra text accompanying notes 268-69.
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other portions of the Court's decision.2 60 Instead, it is likely that the
Court was merely setting forth its reason for a rule of strict con-
struction with respect to the existence of binding federal
contracts.261
There is little doubt that, under the principles set forth in Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. and Bowen, the relationship between
PHAs and the federal government is contractual, and a requirement
that PHAs transfer public housing to tenants would constitute a sub-
stantial repudiation of that contractual relationship. The Housing
Act of 1937 expressly contemplates that the federal government and
PHAs will enter into a contractual relationship.2 62 In fact, the Act
itself sets forth specific provisions that must be incorporated into
the ACC.263 The ACC, executed by the Secretary of HUD and the
Chairman of the PHA, is a lengthy document which includes provi-
sions governing the development and operation of public housing
as well as clauses setting forth the rights and obligations of both
parties. Unlike the statute and "contract" considered by the Court
in Bowen, neither the Housing Act of 1937 nor the ACC contains a
reservation by the United States permitting it unilaterally to alter,
amend or repeal the PHAs' rights or the government's obligations.
To the contrary, the Act and the ACC expressly contemplate that
260 See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 55 (Congress cannot take away the fruits of fully executed
contracts, nor may it repudiate its own debts to save money).
261 The discussion of sovereign power immediately followed the Court's statement
that, in view of the purpose and structure of the Act and Congress's express reservation
of a power to amend, the Court should be reluctant to construe the agreements in a
manner that would foreclose future Congressional action. See id. at 52. Alternatively,
the Court could have been referring to the doctrine which prohibits states from bargain-
ing away their police powers. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819, 821
(1879) (state grant of lottery franchise does not foreclose state from abolishing lotter-
ies); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848) (state may
condemn bridge held by company formed pursuant to a state charter). Nevertheless,
this doctrine typically does not apply to contracts concerning financial matters. See
United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 24 (1977) ("IT]he power to enter into
effective financial contracts cannot be questioned."); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2 CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 103 (1986) (economic obligations of states are
enforceable). One recent district court case, however, has relied on the language in
Bowen to hold that the federal government could alter the contractual right of a devel-
oper of subsidized housing to prepay its mortgage and be released from federal regula-
tion. See Orrego v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 701 F. Supp. 1384, 1396-97
(N.D. Ill. 1988) ("[N]othing in the regulatory agreement, note or [National Housing
Act], surrendered Congress' 'enduring' right to exercise its sovereign authority over the
federal housing programs."). Interestingly, the court in Orrego seems to have inverted
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bowen. Under Bowen, an express reservation to
amend indicated that no contractual or property right existed that was immune to subse-
quent legislation. In Orrego, the court implies that for a contractual or property right to
exist, there must be an express waiver of Congress's power to amend.
262 42 U.S,C. § 1437c(a) (1982) ("The Secretary shall embody the provisions for
such annual contributions in a contract guaranteeing their payment.").
263 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1982) (contract provisions and requirements).
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contractual modifications require the mutual agreement of the
United States and the PHA.264 Under the terms of the Act and the
ACC, the PHA holds title to the public housing,265 and, upon pay-
ment in full of all indebtedness incurred in connection with the con-
struction of the housing, all obligations of the PHA to the federal
government come to an end.266 An additional requirement that the
PHA sell the housing to a third party would impair the contractual
right of the PHA to own the housing free from obligation to or reg-
ulation by the federal government at the end of the forty year
period. 267
Current legal doctrine is unsettled with respect to the conse-
quences of a finding that the federal government has impaired its
own contractual obligation. One line of cases indicates that sub-
stantial impairment automatically results in the invalidation of the
government action or the award of damages. For example, in Lynch
v. United States,268 the Supreme Court considered the constitutional-
ity of a federal statute that abrogated annual renewable term insur-
ance policies issued by the federal government. Upon finding that
the insurance policies were contracts which the government had re-
pudiated, the Court held that the legislation violated the just com-
pensation and due process clauses of the fifth amendment.269
264 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(f) (1982) ("[A]ny contract heretofore or hereafter made
for annual contributions, loans or both, may be amended or superseded by a contract
entered into by mutual agreement between the public housing agency and the Secre-
tary."); ACC Part II § 512 (ACC may be amended by mutual agreement of United States
and PHA). An important reason why the ACC is not subject to unilateral alteration is its
function as security for debt obligations issued by the PHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1987). Creditors would be very hesitant to lend money for construction of
public housing if the federal government could substantially alter its obligations under
the ACC.
265 See, e.g.,42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(1) (1982) ("lower income housing project" defined
as low income housing developed, acquired or assisted by a PHA); ACC Part II
§§ 103(e), (f) (PHA shall acquire good and valid title to each project and properly rec-
ord its deed).
266 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a) (1982) (annual contributions to PHAs shall be paid
over a period not to exceed forty years); ACC Part II § 518 (obligations under ACC
terminate upon payment of all indebtedness of PHA in connection with particular
project).
267 Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), supports the argu-
ment that the federal government may not repudiate its contractual relationship with a
PHA. In Thorpe, the Supreme Court upheld a circular issued by HUD prescribing notifi-
cation requirements for tenant evictions. The Court observed that although the circular
imposed an additional obligation upon the PHA, it left the respective obligations of the
parties to the ACC substantially unchanged. See id. at 279. Citing Lynch, the Court fur-
ther implied that the federal government could not constitutionally enact a law which
derogated or repudiated the PHA's substantial contractual rights. See id. at 279 & nn.
31-33.
268 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
269 See id. at 579; see also Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935) (" 'The
United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate
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However, recent Supreme Court cases suggest that, in deter-
mining whether a federal impairment of a federal government con-
tract violates the fifth amendment, a court should adopt standards
recently promulgated by the Court in its contract clause cases. 270
Upon finding that a state has impaired an obligation of contract, the
Court applies a "dual standard" depending on whether the state it-
self was a party to the impaired contract.271 In most cases, state laws
impairing contracts between private actors are upheld under a stan-
dard which examines "whether the legislation is addressed to a le-
gitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end. ' 272 On the other hand, a state's repudia-
tion of its own contractual obligation is subjected to much more ex-
acting scrutiny. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,273 the Court
invalidated state legislation which had sought to repeal a covenant
limiting the ability of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey to subsidize rail passenger transportation by using revenues
pledged as security for bonds issued by the authority. According to
the Court, deference to legislative decision was not justified in the
case of a government's repudiation of its own obligation. 274 A
state's repudiation of its own contractual obligation would be sus-
tained only if the "impairment was both reasonable and necessary to
serve the admittedly important purposes claimed by the State. ' '275
their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach the term
implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citi-
zen.'") (quoting the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879)); Everett Plywood
Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723, 727 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (federal government cancella-
tion of contract entities other party to damages).
270 See United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 n.25 (1977) (analogiz-
ing contract clause doctrine to "dual standard of review" applied to federal repudiations
of federal government contracts).
271 See id. at 25-26 (dual standard of review exists for state impairments of contracts
depending on whether government is a party to contract).
272 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934). In Blaisdell, the
Court upheld the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law which extended the period dur-
ing which mortgagors could redeem their properties from a foreclosure sale. See also
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (state im-
pairment of damage waiver contracts was substantial, but is "amply justified by the pub-
lic purposes served by the Subsidence Act."); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 (1983) (courts should defer to legislative judg-
ment as to the necessity and reasonableness of particular measures). But see Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (statute providing that pension rights
would vest after period of years regardless of contractual provisions violated contract
clause).
273 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
274 Id. at 26 ("complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and
necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake").
275 Id. at 29. See Bernard Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the
Contracts Clause, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 108 ("The dual standard of review upon which
[United States Trust Co.] turns permits the Court to subject the impairment of the State's
own obligations to the strictest scrutiny.").
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The Court found that the legislation violated the contract clause be-
cause it was "neither necessary to achievement of the plan [encour-
agement of public transportation] nor reasonable in light of the
circumstances." 276
In United States Trust Co., the Court noted that a dual standard of
review was also applicable to federal impairments of contracts.277
Though a high level ofjudicial scrutiny of legislative measures inevi-
tably presents difficult issues concerning the appropriate role of the
judicial branch in a majoritarian political system,278 the doctrine set
forth by the Court, which does not permit the federal government to
repudiate its own contracts merely upon showing a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate government purpose, is justified on grounds of
political theory and economic efficiency.2 79 As the Court observed
in United States Trust Co., the presumption of legitimacy that usually
attaches to governmental actions is absent when the government re-
pudiates its own contract. In such instances, the government is act-
ing in its own self-interest. 280 Therefore, it is appropriate for a
276 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29. For examples of cases applying United States
Trust Co. to state impairments of state contracts, see, e.g., Maryland State Teachers Ass'n
Inc. v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1370 (D. Md. 1984) (changes to state pension system
were necessary and reasonable); Marvel v. Dannemann, 490 F. Supp. 170, 176-77 (D.
Del. 1980) (changes to state pension plan were not necessary).
277 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26 n.25 ("For similar reasons, a dual standard
of review was applied under the Fifth Amendment to federal legislation abrogating con-
tractual gold clauses" (citing Peny and comparing Peny to Norman v. Baltimore &
O.R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), which upheld ajoint resolution of Congress declaring
contracts providing for the payment of gold to be against public policy in the context of
private corporate obligations)).
278 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (courts should
grant wide latitude to legislators even if it results in damage to property); Note, A Process-
Oriented Approach to the Commerce Clause, 89 YALE LJ. 1623, 1636-39 (1980) (arguing
against judicial intrusion into policy judgments of legislatures absent proof of process
failure).
279 By arguing in favor of a non-deferential standard of review for federal govern-
ment repudiations of its own contracts, I do not mean to suggest that a deferential ra-
tional basis test is the appropriate standard by which to judge state and federal
impairments of private contracts. Although a discussion of the appropriate standard for
reviewing such impairments is beyond the scope of this Article, several of the arguments
offered in support of meaningful review of government repudiations of public contracts
would also apply to impairments of private contracts. See Thomas W. Merrill, Public
Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 597, 599 (1987) (Supreme Court should abandon dual standard and adopt uni-
tary analysis of contract clause which affords no presumption in favor of either public or
private obligations).
280 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26. The Court also observed that "[a] govern-
mental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not have to
be raised. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend
the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause
would provide no protection at all." Id. Several commentators, however, have sug-
gested that the model of impartiality ascribed to a government's actions with respect to
contractual relations among private individuals is inaccurate. See Richard A. Epstein,
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court to examine relatively closely the rationale for the legislature's
action to determine whether it is motivated by an impartial analysis
of public policy or by a desire to save money or avoid obligations.28'
A requirement that the federal government adhere to its con-
tractual obligations may also be justified on grounds of economic
efficiency.282 If the federal government could renege on its contrac-
tual obligations, the risk of dealing with the government would
greatly increase. Private parties would likely raise prices for goods
and services they provide to the government to compensate for the
expected cost of government repudiations.28 3 Since most individu-
als are presumed to be risk averse, it is possible that they would
raise costs by more than the expected loss due to repudiation,
thereby leading to excessively high public sector expenses and allo-
cative inefficiency. A rule of law limiting the ability of the federal
government to repudiate its contracts creates a secure environment
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CI. L. REV. 703, 717 (1984) (purpose
of contract clause is to deter rent-seeking); Merrill, supra note 279, at 615 (legislators
represent private interests and therefore are subject to conflicts of interest when they
take actions that impair private contracts). A belief that legislators are not impartial with
respect to impairments of private contractual relationships might support the argument
that such impairments should also be subjected to meaningful scrutiny. See Epstein,
supra, at 750.
281 Cf Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63-65 (1964) (when
government in its capacity as an enterpriser causes economic loss, it should pay compen-
sation under the just compensation clause because it cannot be expected to act with
"restraint and a detached reflection"). There is little reason to fear that subjecting state
and federal governments to a demanding standard when they impair their own contrac-
tual obligations would paralyze the government by requiring it to adhere to obligations
or policies which they no longer desire to follow. Governments may, in such circum-
stances, use the power of eminent domain to condemn the property right which they
seek to repudiate. Of course, such a condemnation requires the payment of just com-
pensation. See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29 n.27 (contractual obligations need
not pose barrier to changes in policy since state has power to condemn contract rights);
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 535 (1848) (state may condemn
contractual right despite contract clause); Epstein, supra note 280, at 740-47 (discussing
just compensation "exception" to prohibition on impairments).
282 The argument that the risk of government repudiation might lead to increased
cost of federal operations and allocative inefficiency mirrors the argument in favor of
compensation for takings of all forms of property. For a more detailed discussion of the
principles involved, see e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation For
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 590-92 (1984); William A. Fischel &
Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of
'Just Compensation" Law, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269 (1988); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 528 (1986); Schill, supra note 218, at
851-53.
283 The Court implied that economic efficiency was one of the reasons for its hold-
ing in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), that the federal government could
not be permitted to repudiate its obligation to provide renewable term insurance to
World War I veterans: "Punctilious fulfillment of contractual obligations is essential to
the maintenance of the credit of public as well as private debtors .... To abrogate
contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would be not the practice of
economy, but an act of repudiation." Id. at 580.
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for parties dealing with the government, thereby promoting both
economical and efficient government operation.28 4
A federal government requirement that PHAs sell their stock of
public housing to tenants is unlikely to meet the Supreme Court's
standard with respect to whether a government's impairment of its
own contract violates the Constitution. In United States Trust Co., the
Court provided some guidance on the application of the "reason-
able and necessary" standard. The Court held that repeal of the
bond covenant was unnecessary because a less drastic modification
would have permitted the Port Authority to achieve its objectives of
promoting public transportation.2 5 The Court found that the state
could have used alternative means to discourage automobile use
and improve mass transit, such as increasing bridge and tunnel tolls
and raising taxes on parking and gasoline.28 6 The Court also found
that repeal of the covenant would not be "reasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances" because at the time the covenant was
granted, the need for additional public subsidy for mass transporta-
tion was foreseeable. 28 7
In applying the "reasonable and necessary" standard to pro-
posed legislation that would require PHAs to sell their housing to
tenants at a fraction of fair market value, the first step is to deter-
mine whether the purposes served by privatization are important.
The federal government could presumably argue that a number of
objectives are served by privatization of public housing, including
improved maintenance and increased stability of homeownership.
Although the wisdom of these policy objectives is open to question,
as I have demonstrated in Part 111,288 courts in the post-Lochner28 9
284 Justifying a high level of scrutiny for government repudiation of its own obliga-
tions on the ground of economic efficiency is subject to two qualifications. First, unlike
most takings of private property, uncompensated repudiations of government contracts
have a self-correcting character. The increased costs created by the government action
would be borne largely by the government itself, thereby reducing the likelihood that it
would repudiate the contract in the first place. Nevertheless, legislators could possibly
have an incentive to repudiate contracts in the hope of reaping short-term political gain,
even though the costs would be borne by taxpayers in the future. See Merrill, supra note
279, at 618. Second, to the extent that the possibility of government repudiation of
contracts increases risk and allocative inefficiency, private parties contracting with the
government could minimize the risk by purchasing insurance. Cf. Kaplow, supra note
282, at 527-42.
285 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29-30.
286 See id. at 30 & n.29.
287 See id. at 31.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 160-75.
289 In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court invalidated a
New York law which prohibited the employment of bakery employees for over 10 hours
a day or 60 hours per week. In its decision, the Court held that the state policy of
regulating labor relations was an invalid intrusion of the state into the freedom of par-
ties to contract. Subsequent Supreme Court cases repudiated the Court's second-guess-
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era are likely to grant the government significant deference in deter-
mining which policy objectives it desires to follow. 290
Nevertheless, although the two goals of transforming tenants
into homeowners and reducing federal expenditures may well be
deemed important, as was the case in United States Trust Co., many
alternative methods of achieving these objectives without impairing
contractual obligations. If the objective of privatization is to im-
prove the operation of public housing, existing management prac-
tices could be improved, management services could be contracted
out or federal oversight could be increased. The objective of giving
tenants greater control over their lives could be accomplished by
greater tenant participation in management rather than the sale of
public housing. For example, residents currently manage several
public housing developments. Though few systematic studies of
tenant management have been completed, the results thus far seem
promising. An audit of one project shows that, from 1982 to 1985,
rent receipts per unit increased by seventy-seven percent; rental in-
come increased by seventy percent and administrative costs de-
creased by sixty percent. 291 Anecdotal evidence also indicates that,
where successful, 29 2 tenant management can reduce vacancies,
crime and welfare dependence.293 According to the results of a ten-
ant demonstration project conducted by Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation in the late 1970s, tenant management re-
sulted in increased employment opportunities, personal develop-
ment and an increased level of satisfaction with project management
among tenants.2 94
ing of legislative purposes. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding state minimum wage law); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(upholding price control legislation).
290 See, e.g., United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29 (purposes of state are "admittedly
important").
291 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 20; Rosalind R.
Inge, Address to President's Commission on Privatization 4 (Oct. 21, 1987) (available
from United States Office of Management and Budget); Robert L. Woodson & Rosalind
R. Inge, Cost Benefit Analysis of the Kenilworth-Parkside Public Housing Resident Man-
agement Corporation: Executive Summary 3 (May 1986) (based on Coopers & Lybrand
analysis).
292 In its report, the President's Commission on Privatization noted that some resi-
dent management organizations fail due to the absence of leadership, insufficient man-
agement skills and difficult relations with PHAs. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 21.
293 See Woodson & Inge, supra note 291, at 4 (describing experience in Boston and
Jersey City).
294 See MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., TENANT MANAGEMENT: FIND-
INGS FROM A THREE-YEAR EXPERIMENT IN PUBLIC HousING 6 (1981). The report on the
demonstration project also stated that management costs were greater under tenant
management than they had been under PHA management. See id. at 6. The report indi-
cated that, with respect to the operation of the public housing, "tenant management
does not usually produce results markedly superior to those stemming from conven-
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Homeownership itself may advance several federal policy objec-
tives, such as permitting low income tenants to benefit from the fi-
nancial rewards of property ownership and encouraging households
to feel part of the capitalist system. The federal government, how-
ever, has a vast array of options at its disposal to achieve this goal
without selling public housing. Under the Section 235 Mortgage In-
terest Subsidy Program, 295 the federal government promotes low-
and moderate-income homeownership by providing mortgage in-
surance and interest subsidies to private lenders. These subsidies
permit participating lenders to charge below-market interest rates
on home mortgage loans, thereby making homeownership more af-
fordable to low income households. 296 In addition, although much
more limited in scope, the Turnkey III Homeownership Opportuni-
ties Program297 permitted public housing tenants to purchase newly
constructed buildings through lease-purchase arrangements. More
recently, Congress enacted the Nehemiah Housing Opportunity
Grants Program, 298 under which federal money will support local
programs that rely on the cooperative efforts of cities, states and
local developers to build housing for low and moderate income
tional housing authority management." Id. at 5; see also Padi Gulati, Consumer Participation
in Administrative Decision Making, 56 Soc. SERV. REV. 72, 83 (1982) ("[I]t is quite clear
from our data that there is no evidence to support the notion that management perform-
ance is improved materially by tenant participation."); DanielJ. Monti, The Organizational
Strengths and Weaknesses of Resident-Managed Public Housing Sites in the United States, 11 J.
URB. AFF 39, 49-51 (1989) (MDRC evaluations of resident management programs were
too optimistic; resident management corporations are unlikely to succeed unless resi-
dents have ability to organize and deal effectively with troublemakers); William A.
Peterman, Resident Management: Putting It In Perspective, 45J. HOUSING 111, 112 (1988)
(successful tenant management conversions cost a "considerable expenditure of federal
dollars"). In 1988, Congress enacted legislation designed to promote tenant manage-
ment. Under the statute, resident management corporations are allowed to retain reve-
nues exceeding operating and project costs for certain purposes, and federal funds are
made available to organize and train resident management groups. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437r(a) (Supp. V 1987).
295 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1988).
296 Approximately 500,000 homes were insured from 1968 to 1973 under the Sec-
tion 235 program. See Silver, McDonald & Ortiz, supra note 140, at 223. The program
was suspended in 1973 as part of the Nixon Administration's moratorium on housing
assistance. After the moratorium, the program was continued on a much smaller scale.
The Section 235 program has been plagued by corruption, mismanagement and a large
default rate since its inception. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOUSING POLICY
AND RECURRING ISSUES, reprinted in HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
308, 311 (Roger Montgomery & Daniel M. Mandelker 2d ed. 1979); R. BRATr, supra note
95, at 135-40; Mitchell, supra note 62, at 199; Robert Schafer & Charles G. Field, Section
235 of the National Housing Act: Homeownership for Low Income Families, in HOUSING URBAN
AMERICA 485 (Jon Pynoos, Robert Schafer & Chester W. Hartman 2d ed. 1980) (editors'
addendum chronicling abuses that occurred under program).
297 See supra text accompanying note 140.
298 Pub. L. No. 100-242, §§ 601-13, 101 Stat. 1951 (1988).
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households. 299
Federal impairment of PHAs' contractual rights is not only un-
necessary to achieve policy objectives,30 0 but is also not reasonable
under the circumstances.30 1 In United States Trust Co., the impairment
of the bond covenant was deemed unreasonable because the need
for additional expenditure for mass transportation was foreseeable
at the time the covenant restricting use of the bond security was
granted. In much the same way, the supposed desirability of trans-
forming tenants into homeowners was foreseeable when most ACCs
between PHAs and the federal government were executed. The fed-
eral government has promoted homeownership among lower in-
come households for several decades. 30 2 In addition, the problems
that have plagued some public housing developments have been ap-
parent at least since the 1950s. 30 3 Therefore, substantially impairing
the contractual rights of PHAs cannot be justified as either neces-
299 Under the Nehemiah program, homes are built by nonprofit developers on land
donated by cities. Financing is obtained from federal grants and state tax exempt
bonds. Purchasers are required to pay 10%o of the cost of their homes at closing. The
program originated in New York City where over 5,000 single family homes have already
been constructed. See M. STEGMAN, supra note 86, at 35-37.
300 An additional policy objective that might arguably be achieved by the sale of
public housing to tenants is the conservation of public revenues. Nevertheless, saving
money has frequently been held an insufficient objective to warrant the federal govern-
ment impairing its own contracts. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 352 (1935);
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 US. 700, 719
(1879). Even if reducing federal expenditures were an appropriate justification for im-
pairment, it is highly questionable that privatization would result in significant savings.
Experience with HUD's Public Housing Sales Demonstration thus far indicates that ten-
ant-purchasers would continue to require a high level of continuing public subsidy. See,
e.g., Department of City & Regional Planning, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, supra note
149, at 31-32 (PHAs participating in voluntary program to sell public housing to tenants
provided funds for maintenance and repair after sale of units); McCormick, supra note
185, at 6; Results of Programs to Sell Units to Public Housing Residents Examined, supra note
185, at 896-97 (1989) (cost of renovating projects prior to sale to tenants is high). In-
deed, the Bush Administration's HOPE proposals contemplate continuing subsidies to
purchasing tenants. See supra note 152.
301 There is some question as to whether the second aspect of the Court's test in
United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), that the impairment be rea-
sonable in the circumstances, is redundant when considered in conjunction with the
requirement that the impairment be necessary. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91
HARV. L. REv. 70, 87 (1977).
302 The Section 235 Program was enacted as part of the Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448 § 101, 82 Stat. 476, 477 (1968). See also
CHARLES ABRAMS, HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR THE POOR: A PROGRAM FOR PHILADELPHIA 115-
42 (1970) (advocating a "used house program" for low income households).
303 At the time most ACCs were executed, public housing financial and operational
problems were evident. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 119-46 (1968) (discuss-
ing public housing and its problems); G. WRIGHT, supra note 50, at 233 (public housing
conditions deteriorated seriously in the 1950s); Bauer, supra note 72 (decrying physical
and social problems of public housing).
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sary to achieve an important government objective, nor as reason-
able based on unforeseen circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that although future federal hous-
ing assistance for low income households should rely to a greater
extent on the private sector for delivery of services, that does not
mean that the federal government should cut back its role in financ-
ing such assistance or abandon its already sizable investment in pub-
lic housing. To the contrary, there remains a need for the public
sector to assist low income households in obtaining adequate and
affordable housing. By using the private sector to deliver these
housing services, it is likely that the greatest number of households
can be assisted for a given level of federal expenditure. There will
remain for the foreseeable future, however, a role in American
housing policy for publicly owned rental housing, especially in those
circumstances where artificial constraints on supply or housing dis-
crimination exist.
Although future housing assistance should not rely to a large
extent on the construction of new public housing, current proposals
to sell public housing to tenants at a fraction of fair market value
contravene sound public policy and would violate the Constitution.
Instead of disposing of its stock of public housing, the federal gov-
ernment should attempt to preserve its investment by preventing its
further decay and by taking steps to ensure sound management.
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